Group HW
Class 40
Piece 180

15(9)

PERS 2-S

Part I

6c
1178

Closed.

3rd August 1945

159

T. Conv

SECRET

EH/52

S.A.C.

Your DS/1312.

As far as we are concerned there is no need to detain any members of PERS ZS.

D.D.(3).
17th July, 1945.

HW 40/180

15(Q) Open

TOP SECRET

DS/1327.

DD(CSA).

Herewith translations of two captured documents from the Pers Z S archives, and dealing with British civil traffic :-

(a) Letter dated 16.6.41 from G. KRUG to Frln. HAGEN, about Foreign Office prefixes.

(b) Relevant extracts from the Pers Z S Annual Report for 1941.

DS/1262 of 14th June, 1945, forwarded a translation similar to (b) above, but for 1942.

15th July, 1945.

15(Q)

TRANSLATION OF A LETTER TO FRAULEIN HAGEN, HEAD OF BRITISH SUBSECTION (II A 2.) OF CRYPTANALYTIC SECTION OF GERMAN MINISTRY OF F.A. (PERS Z S)

Signed KRUG dated 16/6/41

BERLIN 16/6/41

Jägerstr. 12.

My Dear Fraulein Hagen,

Many thanks for your letter of 7/6. As far as our principal tasks allow, we are already investigating the meaning of a few groups which still puzzle us, as e.g. "INDIV", DIPPY or DIPPK etc. DEDIP,DALLY, DEJOU, to mention the most important. If we obtain any results or part results I shall inform you. I cannot yet work on the May material you sent us. If, as you write, "OP" occurs frequently in conjunction with "INDIV", I cannot help thinking that "OP" must be only a departmental designation - perhaps an abbreviation of "opinion" - especially as only one "OP" telegram per day is sent from London to nearly all the British diplomatic missions. Perhaps it is some sort of situation report. For your investigation of the "R-Code" I am sending you, as agreed, the 5-figure indicator groups from the 'R-Code'. Have you had any success with this yet?

Kindest regards,

GEORG (?) KRUG

15(Q)

TRANSLATION OF

ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1941 BY

CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECTION OF THE GERMAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ON CODES AND CYPHERS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

(The last eight and a half pages of the report are not reproduced here. They consist of short reports on the codes and cyphers of THAILAND, PORTUGAL, BRAZIL, SPAIN, ARGENTINA, BOLIVIA, CHILE, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, COLOMBIA, MEXICO, PERU, URUGUAY, VENEZUELA and a few other S. American countries)

G.C.C.S. (S.A.C.)

18th June, 1945.

M.G.F.

Annual Report for 1941 for Section dealing with BRITISH EMPIRE, THAILAND, PORTUGAL, SPAIN and LATIN-AMERICA. (dated 11/2/42)

GREAT BRITAIN

The following were worked on:-

a) British Figure Cyphers

1) The "Interdepartmental Code" ((sic)). The book underlying this code has been captured and occasionally sections of the subtractor were placed at our disposal by OKW and the Air Ministry as they were worked out. We were able to publish a few telegrams from the Middle East. However towards the end of the year the volume of traffic was so small that it no longer appears worth while continuing work on this material.

2) PRODROME : in the hands of Dr. KUNZE

b) British Letter-codes

1) "B 25", a 4-letter, hatted code book of 16,224 groups. It has been broken and recovered to such an extent that it has now been possible for a fairly long time to publish the telegrams almost entirely without missing groups. In Autumn 1940 a captured copy of the original book was sent to us which enables us to read the telegrams completely.

2) "B 22", a 5-letter alphabetic code-book of 84,000 groups. It

has been broken and the telegrams have been published complete for about 3 years now. In summer 1940 we were also given a captured original of this book.

3) "B 30" a hatted code-book of 4 letter groups which is used in the Near, Middle and Far East. The volume is slight but we have begun to make a register and have ascertained the sum of the digits ((Quersumme)) of the groups and the size of the book.

Not worked on:-

A consular cypher in TENERIFFE and LAS PALMAS traffic consisting of a transposed clear-text and of which only a few telegrams were received.

SOUTH AFRICA

Worked on:-

a) "B 22" (See GREAT BRITAIN a) 2) and

b) "B 23" a 5-letter alphabetic code-book about the same size as "B 22" which has been broken and recovered sufficiently to permit the publication, almost entirely without missing groups, of all telegrams coming in - which is a present very few.

Not worked on:-

A letter code in traffic with STOCKHOLM. Too little material. The last telegram of this type was received on 16/12/41.

EIRE

EIRE

Worked on:-

a) "B 22" (See GREAT BRITAIN a) 2) and

b) "B 22" recyphered. Three or four different substitution systems are used, each with 26 "T 26"'s, which are constructed with a Vigenère slide. The recyphering table is used in such a fashion that one 5-letter group is substituted on T 26 n, the next on T 26 n+1, T 26 n+2 or T 26 n+3 or T 26 n-1, T 26 n-2 or T 26 n-3. All the Irish telegrams can be read completely. In 1941 223 Irish telegrams were published

CANADA

Worked on:-

"B 22" (See GREAT BRITAIN a) 2)

Not worked on:-

A 5-letter code , of which only a few isolated telegrams have been received.

In 1941 583 BRITISH EMPIRE telegrams were published.

15(Q)

DS/1322

TOP SECRET

14th July, 1945.

Dear Chitty,

Attached is a list of the captured PERS ZS material which is being sent up to you to-day in four sacks marked DS/1322 A to D.

It is possible that one or two of the items are in fact U.S. State Department and not F.O.

I think it is fair to say that all the batch are untranslatable.

Yours sincerely,

Lt. Colonel R. Chitty,
Chesterfield Street.

CAPTURED PERS ZS DOCUMENTS - BRITISH SYSTEMS

	German Title	Date	Form	Degree of Recovery	Whether Hatted	Remarks
1	B2. Stations Code		5 letter	50%	Yes	Contains loose slips with extra significations.
2	B10		5 letter	Very slight	No	Contains papers dated 8 and 12/1/34 entitled: New Significations for E5 BC 10.
3	B11		5 letter	A few group statistics	?	
4	B12		5 letter	30%	Yes	
5	B12		5 letter	35%	Yes	
6	B13		5 letter	A few group statistics	?	
7	B13 (unused)					
8	B 14					
9	B17		5 letter	A few group statistics	?	
10	B18 Vol. 1	Oct 1930 - 30/9/35	4 letter	40%	Yes	
11	B18 Vol. 2	Oct 1930	4 letter	40%	Yes	
12	B18 Statistik					Group Statistics.
13	B23		5 letter	Very slight	No	Papers (marked for Frl. STARK, c/o Herr SELCHOW, Cypher Bureau) connected with commercial negotiations between Germany and S. Africa, dated 37 and 38. Also copy of telegram of 6/10/37 from KRAUEL, Geneva to M. of F.A. Berlin.

Please turn over

	German Title	Date	Form	Degree of Recovery	Whether Dotted	Remarks
14	B24		5 letter	Very few statistics	?	
15	B25 Vol. 1		4 letter	30%	Yes	
16	B26 SÜDAFRIKA		5 letter	Very few statistics	?	
17	B30 HOLLAND		4 letter	40%	Yes	
18	BH. Buchstaben-hilfscode (letter aux. code)		5 letter	Very slight	No	
19	Englische Gegencode (British Decode)					Register of recovered code groups in B2, B12, B13, B25 against an alphabetical list of significations.
20	?		5 letter	20%	Yes	List of 5 letter address and signature groups each beginning with U.
21	Code N		4 figure	A few statistics	?	
22	D Statistik		4 figure	A few statistics		
23	D		4 figure			List of a few 100 recovered groups.
24	F		4 figure	20%		
25	G ROTTERDAM, HAGUE, COPENHAGEN, LONDON		4 figure	20% group statistics	?	
26	A		4 figure	50%	Yes	
27	E		4 figure	Statistics		Bundle of intercepts London Tromsö to Stockholm, Oct. 1917.

Please turn over

	German Title	Date	Form	Degree of Recovery	Whether Hatted	Remarks
28	[redacted]	(From admin. document in cover) 1918.	4 figure	A few statistics		
29	M		4 figure	A few statistics	Yes	Contains a few intercepts Munich, Odessa, Vilna, Prague, Bucharest, Prodrome London, 1920.
30	Code Q		4 figure	A few statistics	Yes	Contains a few telegrams London - Berlin.
31	Code Q					Folder of telegrams 1919/20.
32	Code Q		4 figure	A few statistics		
33	W					Folder of F.O. telegrams, some decyphered, dates 1924.
34	W					Folder of 4 fig. F.O. cypher telegrams, 1921/22, N.B. "Abyssinia" in ink on cover, obviously not related.
35	Green folder					4 fig. F.O. cypher telegrams.
36	C X 2	1918		A few statistics sheets		Decypher F.O. telegrams.
37	X		4 figure	A few statistics		Contains a few F.O. telegrams.
38	S		4 figure	20% statistics	Yes	Contains 2 F.O. cypher telegrams.
39	W		4 figure	A few statistics		
40	Engl 5 stell. Zahlen in Franz -osisch (British 5 fig. cypher in French)		5 figure	1 or 2 recoveries	Yes	

Please turn over

	Cover title	Date	Form	Degree of Recovery	Whether [illegible]	Remarks
41	Code R		4 figure	Statistics, a few recoveries.		
42	B IV		5 letter	Statistics		Contains F. O. cypher telegrams, London - Berlin.
43	[illegible] II		5 letter	40/1	No	Pencilled inside cover: 1902 (economic).
44	D15 (?) or 1[illegible] (?)		5 letter	Statistics		
45	L Code, decypher, English Cypher X.		4 figure	Statistics, a few recoveries.	Yes	A few F.O. telegrams, partly decyphered. Folder of 5 letter traffic.
46	M26/1. South Africa.	1935/39				
47	M27 South Africa.	1938/1939				Folder of 5 letter traffic, also contains a few crypt-analytic work-sheets.
48	M17	1931/32				Folder of traffic.
49	Part 2	1917/18				Folder of F.O. 4 fig. telegrams partly decyphered
50	M		4 figure	Statistics		Contains bundle of work-sheets.
51	No title					Folder of crypt. workings for 1922 (?).
52	L Cypher		4 figure	Very few recoveries		Arranged on alphabetical encode.
53	M			Statistics, few recoveries.	Yes	
54	M20	1934/34	4 letter			Folder containing traffic.
55	M22	19[illegible] March				Folder containing traffic, partly Chiffrine.

Please turn over

	Cover or Title	Date	Form	Source of Recovery	Whether Marked	Remarks
56	P.C.	1939. March				Folder containing traffic, pref. Prodrome.
57						Folder of 5 letter traffic, Prodrome in French
58	11	1939/44				Folder of traffic, forms headed Chi III. Chapelries. P.C.
59						Photostat of I.C. Decypher 1936 Dep. No. 613, in leverarch folder.
60	[illegible] (British research)	191				Folder of partly decyphered traffic.
61	Foolscap envelope containing P.C. cypher circulars to H.M. Consul Bergen. Ref I 1.35/3/40 also photostats of indicators, table for coding number and date (Cypher I)	Oct. 31/1939				
62	Folder containing photostat copy 19 decypher tools.					
63	[illegible] British Mark, Decypher C,I.C.	Sept. 1, 193[illegible]				G.C.C.S. (S.I.S.) 14th July, 194[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] Decypher C.	" " "				
65	Photostats and indicating planes; rules for use and working of Cypher I, P.C.	1/3/39				

15(a)

D/1315

[redacted]

H.Q.(L.G.A.)

(Copies to :- Mr. Hinsley
Major Cussen
D.D.I.)

With reference to CX/MSS/I-23 - the full interrogation report on members of 7573 Bn, Auswertigen Amt, would you please let us have the names of those prisoners whom you wish still to be detained for possible further interrogation.

G.S.I., War Department, Washington, have requested that the following persons of [redacted] Bn, now at Bedford, should continue to be detained for the time being :-

[redacted]
Frln. [redacted]
Frln. [redacted].

Cp. Insp. Lt. [redacted], the [redacted] specialist in Turkish, Polish and Slavonic countries, who has not yet been investigated by us, is now held at Bedford with that unit.

[redacted]

16th July, 1945.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Subject: Burg personnel 11 July 1945
To : Mr Hinsley,
Cmdr Dudley-Smith

I have told Lt-Col. Johnson that if Marburg will hang on to the following persons for the time being, SSA has no objection to the release of the others.

Kunze
Paschke
Schauffler
Karstien
Frln. Friedrichs
Frln. Hagen

John N. Seaman
Major, Signal Corps

[redacted]

15(Q)

11th July, 1944.

Dear Johnson

1. Hall has recently told us of Capt. Lamberry's difficulties at Marburg, which I understand he explained to Colonel Dicker personally and which I remember you raised with us during your last visit here. I attach a copy of a memorandum on the subject which Lamberry handed to Hall in Marburg, and would like your help on the several points connected with it, as outlined below.

2. Since Hall's visit, further developments have occurred which made us agree to release all Marburg personnel except 6.

3. With reference to the remaining 6 personnel who are to be kept at Marburg, I wonder if you could arrange for Colonel Dicker to reply as follows to Lamberry's letter, if you and he agree?

(a) They are to be kept under guard until further instructions from Director C.I.O. Bizerta.

(b) They should not be permitted to circulate beyond the immediate vicinity of Marburg.

(c) There is no objection to the personal effects mentioned being fetched by friends or agents of the owner, provided:

(i) that such friends are not themselves under detention,

(ii) the effects are not now situated in the russian zone.

(d) There is no objection to these persons being locally employed at Captain Lamberry's discretion.

(e) All further communications on these prisoners from Lamberry should be to Director, C.I.O. Bizerta.

(f) Message Harrison, A.M.I.5. Bizerta.

With reference to query (x) of Lansbery's letter, we do not know the answer here. Perhaps you can advise him on this point?

4. I understand that both Lansbery and Bull, when they saw Colonel Bicher, reported that they were concerned as to the risk at present run regarding the German Foreign Office Archives now stored at Schloss Marburg. These Archives, as you know, are at present under exploitation by a joint State Department/Foreign Office Team. They estimate that their work will take not less than a year and from what I am able to gather, one burglar could tunnel in through the window one night might easily put an abrupt end to this research. Could Colonel Bicher influence the authorities concerned to provide a better guard, as it is likely that these Archives will contain material of mutual interest to us? What is really required, I gather, is a permanent body of troops (say of Company strength) to guard several exits both above and underground. It is desirable that these troops should get to know their duties thoroughly. The present arrangement is one by which, no sooner have sentries been posted, than they are relieved or redeployed and consequently have no opportunity of learning the terrain. We should be most grateful for anything that you could do in this matter.

Chairman TICOM.

Lt. Colonel Johnson,
U.S. G.I.S. [redacted],
A.P.O. 757.

Copies to:-
Lt. Cdr. Hanson
Major Seaman
Cdr. Bull
Cdr. Dudley-Smith
Cdr. Bacon

COPY

HEADQUARTERS
DETACHMENT F102, 2d MSA DETACHMENT

APO 658

23 June 45

SUBJECT: Disposition of German Nationals.

TO: Commander Hull, Royal Naval Reserve.

1. On 9 May 1945, this detachment received a shipment of German Nationals under command of Major Ubben who were ordered to be housed and fed by the Marburg Burgermeister and to be checked for security purposes once weekly. They were to be held until ordered released or otherwise disposed of by Lt. Col. Neff.

2. Since that date other shipments have been received until there are at present 82 persons here in this category.

3. During this period no further instructions of any kind have been received concerning the disposition of these persons.

4. It is requested that instructions be issued in this connection covering the following points:

a. Are these persons to be kept under guard indefinitely?

b. Can they be permitted to circulate beyond the immediate vicinity of Marburg?

c. If they are to be retained here what provision can be made to get the personal effects of the last 22 who arrived unannounced in advance and with little baggage after a plane trip from England?

d. Can these persons be used for work projects as many of them have expressed a desire not to remain entirely idle?

e. With what higher headquarters can this detachment communicate should an emergency arise?

f. Through what channels will instructions be received.

concerning these German Nationals as they represent groups sent here by various nations?

5. Who is responsible for any medical attention required by them?

JULIUS H. [redacted]
Captain, AUS
Public Safety Officer.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Group/Class ..... HW 40 .....

Piece ..... 180 .....

TICOM/D-3 retained under Section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958

(date) ..... 11/2/2012 .....

(Signed) .....

ACTION

Ref I 22

and Replace by Circ

and I 27

Flexible Heater
to Schedule | Ref 25
Chf Architect |
Chf Surveyor |

6.74

INFORMATION

Blake 8/7 Oliver
Campbell ~~Peto~~
Rolf

DISPOSAL

15 (53)

TOP SECRET

TICOM/I-27

PRELIMINARY INTERROGATION OF FRAEULEIN HAGEN,

HEAD OF ENGLISH SECTION OF PERS ZS, AUSWAERTIGES AMT

Attached are notes on the preliminary interrogation of Fraeulein Ursula HAGEN of PERS ZS, German Foreign Office, carried out at the Public Security Office, MARBURG/LAHN, on 23rd June 1945, by Cdr. G. Bull, R.N.V.R.

TICOM
I July 1945

No. of Pages 1

Distribution:

British
Director
D.D.3.
D.D.4.
D.D.(N.S.)
D.D.(M.W.)
D.D.(A.S.)
A.D.(C.C.R.) (2)
Lt.Col. Leathem

TICOM
Chairman
S.A.C. (2)
Cdr. Bacon
Cdr. Mackenzie
Cdr. Tandy
Lt.Col. Johnson
Lt.Cdr. Manson
Major Seaman
Lieut. Eachus
Lieut. Vance
Captain Cowan
Lieut. Fehl
TICOM Files (2)

U.S.
OP-20-G (2) (via Lt. Pender[illegible])
G-2 (via Lt.Col. Hilles)
S.S.A. (2) (via Major Seaman)
Director, S.I.D. ETOUSA (2) (via Lt.Col. Johnson)

Additional
S.A.C. (1 extra for Cdr. Bull)

TOP SECRET

Ursula Hagen, born Berlin 23rd March 1901, joined Auswaertiges Amt 1st October 1922. Had a good knowledge of English and preliminary training consisted of studying of code messages already broken and cryptographic material available. At this time work was principally concentrated on a non-hatted 5-letter code [G.T.C.?] and a 4-letter hatted code which changed after about a year ['R' Code?]. Later on work was started on Spanish and Portuguese Codes.

2. In about 1939, Fraeulein Hagen took charge of the English, Spanish and Portuguese section of the Department. During the war no Cyphers were solved but work was done on a captured Interdepartmental Cypher on a depth of 5 or 6. Believed that neither OKW nor Forschungsamt were successful with Diplomatic Cyphers although they were attempted.

3. The three departments worked on British Codes and sometimes 2 copies of the same telegram representing independent solutions, would be forwarded to the Secretary of State. Although the bulk of the material was of no great importance, the traffic was considered of sufficient interest for the work to be kept up. Perhaps one telegram a week would be of considerable political interest.

4. Fraeulein Hagen had only come out of hospital two days previously and explained that as a result of her illness her memory had been considerably affected and she was unable to recall details of the important messages which she had mentioned. She did, however, instance a telegram from London to Washington in January 1945 which referred to destruction of copies of the Atlantic Charter. This was considered of great interest but was transmitted in 5-letter code.

5. The 4-letter code was read currently in 1945 as also was the Italian Code [probably 'Q'].

6. At this time 3 separate 4-letter codes were being worked on and broken simultaneously. The department reckoned that it took about three months to reconstruct one of these codes.

7. The plain language, i.e. solved, copies of code telegrams submitted by the department carried no secrecy marking but raw material was invariably marked Geheime Reichsache.

TICOM/I-22

Please amend classification of second and following pages:-

TOP SECRET "U".

(E (C))

TOP SECRET 'U'

TICOM/ I-22

INTERROGATION OF GERMAN CRYPTOGRAPHERS OF THE 'PERS ZS'

DEPARTMENT OF THE AUSWÄRTIGES AMT

This publication is a report on the interrogation of twenty-one cryptographers of 'Pers ZS' carried out in UK at seven meetings during May 1945. 'Pers ZS' worked only on diplomatic systems.

TICOM
2 July, 1945

Copy No. 15
No. of pages:31

Distribution

British
1. Director
2-8 D.D. 3 (7)
9. D.D. 4
10. D.D. (N.S.)
11. D.D. (MW)
12. D.D. (A.S.)
13-14. A.D. (C.C.R.) (2)
15. Col. Leatham

U.S.
32-33. OP20-G(2) (via Lt. Pendergrass)
34. G-2 (via Lt. Col. Hilles)
35-36. S.S.A. (2) (via Major Seaman)
37-38. Director, S.I.D. ETOUSA (2) (via Lt. Col. Johnson)

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24. Lt. Col. Johnson
25. Maj Seaman
26. Lt. Eachus
27. Lt. Vance
28. Capt. Cowan
29. Lt. Fehl
30-31. Ticom Files (2)

Additional
39. Dr. Forster
40. Dr. Pickering
41. Lt. Col. Evans
42. Lt. Comdr. Mansen
43. Major G.W. Morgan

Note: C.C.R.

Interrogation of German Cryptographers

of the 'Pers ZS' Department of the Auswärtiges Amt

Seven meetings were held at which 17 male and 4 female cryptographers were interviewed. The attached Minutes provide a record of the proceedings.

The interrogators were concerned to conceal their own knowledge of the details of the subject and of any specific German or foreign system. The Germans were co-operative and ready to answer questions and volunteer statements.

We know from Ultra sources that Schauffler had been concerned with the cryptographic details of German Diplomatic Cyphers but we did not question him on this subject nor did he speak about it himself.

Interrogation was allowed to develop naturally from such general questions as "What was the nature of your work?" Or questions were put on the captured material we now hold. For example we raised the question of Swedish usage by referring to the Swedish-made Hagelin Machine found among the 'Pers ZS' papers.

The general impression of the party as a Cryptographic Unit was that it was competent but limited. It was seriously handicapped by lack of staff. Hollerith machinery was not introduced until 1942 and then only in small quantities and rather by chance than considered policy. Little or no encouragement came from above and neither directives nor pressure to complete tasks were forthcoming. Liaison with other German Cryptographic Units was very bad and with Allies of Germany non-existent. They were frightened by Machine Cyphers as a practical problem although some theoretical work had been undertaken on the security of such cyphers. They seemed to have relished their low-grade successes unduly and to have been too ready to reject as impossible - and then to forget - the high-grade systems beyond their powers. The senior officers were convinced of the security of German high-grade systems. Virtually no intelligence work was done on the contents of broken messages.

The work of 'Pers ZS' was confined to diplomatic systems and did not include Service Attaché Cyphers. The OKW and Goering's Forschungsamt also worked on Diplomatic systems and the relations of all three stations were marked by jealousy rather than by co-operation.

More can be learned of the German attack on British Diplomatic Systems from Frl. Hagen who is now ill under supervision at Marburg, and we recommend that she be interrogated.

One other member of the party still remains to be interrogated. This is Dr. Helmut Grunsky, a mathematician, who is at present in hospital.

Photographs and finger-prints of all these interrogatees are filed in C.C.R. Section G.C.&C.S.

E.R. Vincent,
Acting Chairman for D.D.(4)

4th June, 1945

9th May, 1945 at the Court Hotel, First Martin at 11.30.

Present: Brigadier Tiltman (in the chair), Professor Vincent [illegible]

and later: Professor Dr. [illegible].

1. It was agreed before the meeting
   a. to treat general matters only
   b. to interview Professor [illegible] first.

2. Professor [illegible] was then asked to sketch the organisation to which he belonged. It was made clear to him that the meeting had arisen from the desire of the Americans to [illegible] or his colleagues into imparting information against their will. He replied that he and his colleagues were prepared to talk on a professional basis of 'exchange of results' though it was clear to them that the exchange would necessarily be onesided.

3. He gave the official designation of his organisation as Department 'Pers Z S' of the Auswärtiges Amt. It had formerly been known as the 'Chiffrierabteilung' but later the cover 'Pers Z S' was adopted. The organisation was concerned with cryptography on foreign diplomatic codes and cyphers; no military or other material was handled.

4. There was another department of the Auswärtiges Amt which dealt with the production and security of German diplomatic systems, but any liaison between it and 'Pers Z S' was purely informal. This department had remained in Berlin until the end.

5. The head of the organisation was Gesandter SELCHOW. The three sections of which it consisted were under

Oberregierungsrat [illegible]
" Dr. [illegible]
" Dr. [illegible]

6. Dr. Kunze was an old hand and been in the organisation for 27 years. He was responsible for the intial breaking of difficult systems, recypherments etc. His staff consisted largely of mathematicians. Hollerith machines had not been available to him until 1942 but by the end he had about 20 machines. This was thought to be due to the personal interest of Ribbentrop.

7. Dr. Fischer was responsible for [illegible]. His section was organised by countries and languages. He also carried out such liaison as was done with the Wehrmacht.

8. ORR Schauffler: a mathematician. Started life as a schoolmaster, was gassed in the last war and on return to his job found schoolmastering too much for him. Entered this organisation [illegible]

[illegible]

machine. With this in mind the question of the distribution of [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

10. Professor Rohrbach was at pains to explain his own position. He had a chair of mathematics at Prague, which he held concurrently with his appointment with the Foreign Office, travelling often back and forth. He had chanced to be at Durgscheidungen when the place was overrun. The senior members of the organisation had panicked in the absence of selchow, and he was the only person who had had the presence of mind to take any common sense action. He had thus become the leader of the party. He was careful to point out that this was not due to any position he held within the organisation or to any superior competence he might have as a cryptographer, but purely to force of character. In discussion of question of cryptographic detail he wished to be regarded merely as a member of Dr. Kunze's section.

11. The gentlemen appeared to be as comfortable as was consistent with the circumstances, but were concerned about one of their number, Dr. GRUNSKY, who was suspected of having acute tuberculosis. This had been discovered the day before they left Germany. It was arranged that he should have a medical examination. [Comment: he has since been admitted to hospital and was therefore not available for interrogation. He is a member of Dr. Kunze's section.]

SECOND MEETING (At 3 o'clock on 9th May 1945 at the Oratory School)

Present: The foregoing and Dr. Kunze, Dr. Paschke and ORR Schauffler

12. The basis on which the meetings were to be conducted was explained to the new arrivals. The principle of 'one-sided exchange' ('einseitiger Austausch') was agreed to. [Comment: The interrogators felt much obliged to Lt.Col. Evans who appears to have been originally responsible for this highly diplomatic formula.]

13. Dr. Kunze was asked to sketch what in his opinion the principal successes of the organisation had been.

14. He stated that he himself had been employed on similar work by the High Command in the last war and mentioned success with British naval cypher at that time.

15. In 1924 he had broken a French system of bigram substitution using 100-figure bigram tables on a 4 figure book.

16. Russian systems had been read at that time but, as Dr. Paschke observed, after the appearance of the British White Paper in 1927 the Russians changed their systems and discouraged circular telegrams; there was then not enough depth.

17. Polish systems consisting of subtractor tables on a 4 figure book were mentioned as having been solved at about that time.

18. In 1929 or 1930 they began to read Jugoslav traffic employing bigrammatic substitution on a 5 figure book. At first the recypherment was applied horizontally, later vertically. Manchurian systems were mentioned, but conversation branched off to the subject of Japanese. At this point ORR. Schauffler also took part in the conversation.

19. Japanese: Until 1934 lower grade Japanese systems were read currently. After 1934 the Japanese went over increasingly to the use of a machine. The moral effect of the machine on the party had been considerable and it was some time before they discovered that it could theoretically be broken. They did not in fact read any traffic until September 1938. They then read the machine currently until February 1939 when it became unreadable owing to difficulties with the wheel turn-over [Comment: The use of a different machine does not seem to have been considered]. In the meantime they read all the back traffic as far back as 1936. They continued to read the lower grade material currently until the end.

20. Chinese: OKH. Schauffler had worked on Chinese systems for 20 years, part of the time in conjunction with the celebrated linguist Legationsrat Krebs, whose pupil he considered himself to be. They read 4 figure and 4 letter traffic until 1930. At the beginning of the war Chinese was taken up again in conjunction with the O.K.W., which supplied personnel. It was agreed to discuss Far Eastern traffic in detail at some later meeting.

21. They handled no attaché traffic, either Japanese or any other, Dr. Steinberg of the O.K.W. was said to have worked on Japanese military attaché traffic.

22. British: In 1939 Kunze was approached by the Luftwaffe for assistance with British weather cyphers. He was successful with these.

23. In May 1938 they began to break a British diplomatic system. In 1940 to 41 the tables ran for three months, so that there was considerable depth [Comment: Uncertain whether these two sentences refer to the same system]. They found however that the labour involved was such that it was too much trouble to read the material currently without machines. On the introduction of 'special' keys the investigation was discontinued. A written report was available on this subject [Comment: The circumstance that this investigation was broken off in 1941 and that Hollerith machinery became available in 1942 may be connected, though this point was not raised at the time. They appear at all events to have had no further success with British systems. It was thought best not to press this point for the time being but to discuss it in detail at a later meeting].

24. In 1943 the American strip system No. 2 was solved, but with considerable time lag. It involved a great deal of time and effort. A machine was designed to eliminate this, and Dr. Kunze thought that it must be with the machinery sent from Hermsdorf in three waggons, only one of which had arrived at Zschepplin. He thought that most of the workings on this system had been destroyed at Zschepplin.

25. Italian: Dr. Paschke was asked what success he had had with Italian systems. He replied that he had been instructed in 1935 to devote special attention to Italian and that the results had been the best imaginable; they had read everything ('Den schönsten Erfolg, den man sich denken kann; es wurde alles gelesen'). In 1942-43 work became increasingly difficult: the Italians increased their subtractor material before the collapse and employed bigram substitution over a subtractor over a book. If they had changed the book, the traffic would have become 'impossible' to read. After the collapse they read a Government code 'Impero' recyphered with figures from the encode, with little depth. Later the Government systems were not read for lack of depth, but it was thought that they used double transposition. The Neofascists had used a 5,000 figure subtractor; the peculiar systematic arrangement of the figures in the subtractor assisted solution very much. In the last three months the Neofascists had used unrecyphered books which were easily read, and an alphabetical book with a short subtractor called RA 1.

26. Captured material: When asked what assistance they had had from captured material he said that it was unwelcome and seldom useful. They had never had any liaison with foreign (e.g. Finnish, Hungarian or Japanese) cryptographic organisations and had never been visited by foreign cryptographers.

27. Note: All four gentlemen seemed to be fully cooperative, includ- Dr. Paschke, contrary to reports from the field. They were concerned about their security, as they had no privacy and would in the long run find it difficult to keep the nature of their work secret from their fellow internees. It was suggested that they might be prepared to write reports on their activity, to which all replied that they would be prepared to do so but their present circumstances were unsuited to 'scientific work'.

The meeting was adjourned.

THIRD MEETING

Held at 101 Nightingale Lane, Wandsworth on 10.5.45 at 12.15

Present: Professor Vincent (in the chair), Col. Cook U.S.A., Lt. Fehl U.S.A., Dr. Forster, Frl. Friedrichs
and later: Frl. Dr. Pannwitz, Frau Dr. Hühnke, Frl. Schrader.

28. It was decided before the meeting
a. to discuss general matters only
b. to see Frl. Friedrichs alone first.

29. The basis on which the meetings were to be conducted was explained to Frl. Friedrichs, who agreed. The conversation was conducted in English.

29. Frl. Friedrichs stated that her duty was decypherment of Bulgarian and other Slavonic cyphers. She had, however, from time to time been loaned to other sections. For instance she had been loaned for a time to Dr. Kunze at the time when the American strip system Number 2 was being broken. She had maintained a personal interest in the American strip system and had clearly enjoyed the work very much. She mentioned Herr Zastrow as an authority on U.S. systems.

31. Her approach to the work as a whole was a professional one, the work gave her pleasure and she felt a proprietary interest in it.

32. She touched on the position of women in the organisation. She said it had been a long fight to obtain for women the same pay as men, but that that had finally been achieved, but, though they received the same pay they had not the same status. At the beginning of the war a great many women had been engaged somewhat to the chagrin of men who had not been used to working with large numbers of women. She instanced the case of one woman who had reached a senior position in the organisation, Frl. Hagen, for whom she evidently had a great admiration, and whom she characterised as an extremely able cryptographer. Her duty was primarily British cypher systems and the systems of the Spanish and Portuguese countries. At the time of their departure from Germany Frl. Hagen was in hospital with a skin complaint.

33. When asked whether she knew of any connection that the organisation had with similar organisations outside, she answered in the negative. Such liaison as was done was carried out by Dr. Paschke. She gave the impression that, far from there having been any coordination between the various cryptographic organisations, there was a considerable feeling of rivalry.

34. The general impression that she gave of her organisation was that it was a small, self-contained show, functioning entirely by itself, that it was starved of personnel and equipment and that little interest was taken in it higher up. *

* Total personnel she thought was about 120, of whom 10 were employed in the Slavonic section.

35. The Head of the organisation was a competent administrator who understood little about cryptography, and was content to leave the specialists to run their affairs as it seemed best to them.

36. When asked whether there had ever been any evidence of appreciation of the work done in the organisation, she replied that there had been none. From time to time, copies of the telegrams they issued had been returned to them bearing a stamp indicating that they had been by the Führer, otherwise no indication of the importance attached to this work had penetrated to the level at which she worked.

37. No intelligence was extracted from the material by them, except such as was necessary in order to enable them to continue reading the traffic. There was no sense of urgency in the office, decyphered messages were not transmitted by teleprinter to their recipients.

38. In the matter of translation of decyphered texts, the organisation had established rigid rules and in general favoured a literal translation in contradistinction to the practice of the OKW, which was always concerned to round off and polish up the translation and make it flow, usually leaving out corrupt groups or obscure passages.

39. There was little encouragement given to communication of results inside the organisation by junior members, who were encouraged to mind their own business. In general such exchange of results as was carried out was done on a purely informal basis as between friends.

40. Frl. Friedrichs was concerned about the possible fate of the men. She herself had been about the world a fair amount and would find it easy to obtain different employment after the war. Most of the men were already in late middle age; they had done nothing but cryptography all their lives and had no other interests and she did not see how they were going to support themselves without it. [Comment: No statement was made by the interrogators in response to this hint regarding the eventual disposal of the members of this organisation.]

41. It was felt that little more of a general nature could be elicited, so that it was decided to call in the remaining ladies, Frau Dr. Kühnke, Frl. Dr. Hemmitz and Frl. Schröder. A short discussion on personal matters was held with them. They were concerned about the fate of their men-folk and wished information to be given to their relations in Germany that they were safe and sound if this were possible. It was pointed out that the members of the meeting had no power to do this but were prepared to transmit such requests; they could, however, give no guarantee that anything would be done. None of the ladies appeared any the worse for their two days' sojourn in Holloway Prison.

Intermediate Meeting held at 101 Nightingale Lane, Wandsworth on 15th May 1945 at 3 p.m.

Present: Mr. Forster; Frl. Friedrichs, Frau Dr. Kühnke, Frl.Dr.Hemmitz

41a. The real object of this meeting was to obtain information on the whereabouts of Frl. Hagen, the specialist on British and American systems (see para. 32), with a view to ensuring her to have true non-political information to be given to their relations in Germany, that they were safe and sound if this were possible. It was pointed out that the members of the meeting had no power to do this but were prepared to transmit such requests; they could, however, give no guarantee that anything would be done. None of the ladies appeared any the worse for their two days' sojourn in Holloway Prison.

41b. Before the meeting took place, the interrogator was met, on arrival in the German detainees' wing by a young German woman who did not belong to the party he intended to see and was apparently a new arrival. She said: 'Wer sind Sie?' and got the reply that the interrogator was looking for Frl. Friedrichs. She then said: 'Sind Sie vom Auswärtigen Amt?'. The interrogator denied any connexion with the Foreign Office.

41c. Frl. Friedrichs and her party being assembled in a separate room, Frau Dr. Hühnke said that Frl. Hagen was last heard of in the German military hospital at Zschepplin. This hospital was housed in the Schloss, the same building as was occupied by the 'Pers.ZS' personnel. She suffered from 'Gesichtsrose' (erysipelas) and when they had last seen her was too ill to be moved. She was presumably still there and would, they thought, be glad to be evacuated out of the way of the Russians. [Comment: this reason for evacuating Frl. Hagen was not suggested by the interrogator.]

41d. When asked to describe her they all agreed that she was tall, fair-haired and anaemic-looking, walked with a characteristic stoop and had a high squeaky voice. Age about 38.

41e. Frau Dr. Hühnke was very worried at the probable fate of her mother and infant son Horst in a Russian occupied area. The interrogator did his best to calm her.

41f. The meeting was adjourned, its object achieved. The information was telephoned from Nightingale Lane to A.D.(C.C.R.) and TICOM representatives. [Comment: Frl. Hagen has since been evacuated from Zschepplin to Marburg where she is in hospital under supervision.]

Fourth Meeting; held at the Oratory School on 19th May, 1945 at 11 a.m.

Present: Prof. Vincent (in the chair), Major Seaman U.S.A., Lt. Fehl, U.S.A., Dr. Forster.
and later: Dr. Kunze, Professor Rohrbach, Herren Rave, Hierer and Grosse.

42. Dr. Kunze and Professor Rohrbach were called.

43. When examining the captured material it was found that the most recent work reports were missing. The gentlemen were asked what the explanation of this was. They replied that all the documents of the research section had been destroyed at Zschepplin.

44. Dr. Kunze was then asked about the machine, mentioned at a previous meeting (see para. 24), for solving the American strip. This machine was for decoding, not for analysing. Double-length strips were hung on lugs attached to rollers. The cypher text was typed on a machine which unrolled the strips so that the cypher text was visible along the bottom of the window. The clear text was then visible on some line higher up in the window. An electric device had been designed to illuminate the frequent clear text letters. This was abandoned, as it was found more convenient to print the common letters in heavy type on the strips and read off the lines containing the greatest number of letters in heavy type. The strips were made 52 letters long and were arranged in a bank of 15. The machine was thought to be with some Hollerith machinery in two wagons which had never arrived at Zschepplin. [Comment: see para. 24.]

45. With respect to the Hagelin Machine found among the captured material, Dr. Kunze said it was thought that Roumania, Sweden and Finland used this machine. No traffic had ever been solved for Italian time and personnel. He had heard it said that the Hagelin was also used by the French and American armies. The specimen mentioned had been required by the organisation for general investigation of its properties and had never been used to decode anything. [Comment: the number on the cylometer of the machine is only 295.]

46. Dr. Kunze was then asked about the Japanese machine traffic discussed at previous meeting; (see para. 19) and whether a machine had been constructed to decode it. He replied no, that they had been able to achieve the desired result with paper models.

47. Major Rohr then asked about the purpose of a number of rotary switches found among the captured material. Dr. Kunze said that he was not quite sure what switches were meant but he thought that they were captured material ('Beutematerial') sent to them 'in case they come in useful', as electrical fittings of this kind were in short supply.

48. Scandinavian systems were next discussed. No material had been read. Swedish traffic, thought a priori to be Hagelin, was investigated for three months in 1941. At first the machine had 25 letters, then after two months a machine with 26 letters was introduced. In August 1944 another investigation was begun, in which Professor Rohrbach participated, to determine whether the indicators fitted the Hagelin pattern.

49. Asked about Turkish systems, on which there was a noticeable lack of material among the captured documents, Dr. Kunze stated that all the Turkish material had been burnt.

50. Dr. Kunze was then dismissed and Messrs. Rave, Hierer and Grosse were called. Professor Rohrbach in the meantime explained that these gentlemen were of a definitely lower grade and had come to 'Pers ZS' to be trained. He spoke of them with obvious distaste.

51. Messrs. Rave, Hierer and Grosse were all employed by the O.K.W. and loaned to 'Pers ZS' in December 1943 to assist with Chinese and Japanese traffic.

52. Rave had joined the O.K.W. in October 1941. He was first at Tirpitzufer 72 - 76 until it was bombed out, then at In Dol, Dahlem. He had got his friend Hierer into the O.K.W. because of his knowledge of Chinese. Grosse had been employed on Italian at the O.K.W. and was later transferred to Chinese. It did not appear that he had any knowledge of the latter language.

53. Rave, the spokesman of the group, gave a sketch of the organization of O.K.W. Chi. The head was Oberst Kempf, who was relieved in 1943 by Oberst Heller. The sections were: translating and [illegible], under Ministerialrat Fenner; Interception; Intelligence, under Oberst Hallstein; cryptographic research under [illegible]; and 'Z', the [illegible] Berlin; with administration and personnel.

54. Rave and the others had worked in Fenner's section under Oberleutnant Miller. This group consisted of 12 - 15 people, engaged at first on Japanese only, then Chinese.

55. When asked what they had heard of possible successes at O.K.W. Chi, they said that they had heard vaguely of successes on American and British systems and mentioned American military attaché reciphered code read in 1942 when Rommel was in North Africa. They thought it had been broken by cryptography, not through physical compromise. [Comment: it was plain that these statements were based on rumour only.]

56. They admitted that most of the work done in 'Pers.ZS' was duplicated in the O.K.H., which worked on diplomatic systems only. Service systems were dealt with by the respective services concerned, O.K.H., O.K.M. etc. Liaison between O.K.W. and 'Pers.ZS' was carried on by Fenner and Lewicka. [Comment: Lunze and Winkler had been military cryptographers in World War I.], who were concerned at the amount of duplication and worked to avoid it. Their efforts were not regarded with favour by Selchow. There had been some co-operation, early in 1943 on Turkish, but apart from that the loan of Rave, Hierer and Grosse to 'Pers.ZS' had been the only occasion they know of on which the two departments had worked together. The situation was not improved by O.K.W.'s practice of calling up competent people from other departments, putting them in the ranks and then drafting them into its own cryptographic organization.

57. The O.K.W. had neither the long tradition nor the expertise which 'Pers.ZS' possessed, though Ministerialrat Fenner and a small party had been engaged on this work in peace-time. [Comment: it is possible that this was said in deference to Professor Rohrbach who was present throughout this interview.]

58. In the matter of captured material and machines, Rave said that new arrivals at O.K.W. Chi had been shown a British machine captured at Dunkirk. It was broken and rusty and did not work.

59. Chinese and Japanese systems: They had read a Chinese Military Attaché system, which had ceased in April or May 1943. The first groups of the traffic were EFR, SKW or JKW. The recypherment consisted of transposition within the code groups. The groups were 3 letter groups. They solved the recypherment but never read any messages.

60. Another Chinese traffic, with descriminant NKDEN, was investigated. It also consisted of 3 letter groups but was unrecyphered. It contained many spells which were easily recognizable, the names etc. being spelt out in simple substitution. It was a purely military code.

61. They broke a Japanese 'Kennwort - Code' consisting of double transposition of 2 and 4 letter groups from a known book; the transposition was done by a stencil, the stencil being the same for both transposing operations. The system was broken on a re-encypherment. It was a diplomatic system used between Moscow and Tokio. They read it from the middle of 1942 to June or July 1943.

62. No work was done on Japanese attaché systems. Rave remembered the Japanese Naval Attaché' traffic [illegible].

63. Grosse, who had done Italian work in the O.K.H., mentioned a diplomatic system of 22 or 23 Italian cities which had been solved. His statement in general terms only, as he left before the [illegible] meeting on Italian work in 'Pers.ZS' (see para. 69). The Italian section in the O.K.H. consisted of 4 to 5 people.

64. Professor Rohrbach pointed out, after these explanations had been dismissed, that their statement on the Japanese 'Kennwort - Code' had been inaccurate. The recypherment was simple [illegible], not double.

Fifth Meeting; held at the Civil Service School on 19th May 1945 at 3 p.m.

Present: Prof. Vincent (in the chair), Major Bowman U.S.A., Lt. Fehl, U.S.A., Dr. Forster.
and later: In succession: Dr. Karstien, RR. Lastrow, Prof. Rohrbach

65. Dr. Karstien and Professor Rohrbach were called together. Dr. Karstien however objected to the presence of Rohrbach and it was agreed to interview him alone. [Comment: Rohrbach informed the meeting later that there was considerable antagonism between himself and Karstien.]

66. Dr. Karstien had been employed on Slavonic systems until 1930 when he changed to Chinese. In 1938 after the Anschluss the Slavonic countries became more important and he went back to them.

67. The Yugoslavs used a five figure code with letter bigram tables consisting of 100 bigrams. This system was read from 1938 to 1943, when traffic dropped, after which it was read with interruptions. They had not received any Tito traffic, nor military attaché.

68. Arising out of the matter of attaché systems he gave a short summary of the division of work between the O.K.W. and 'Pers.ZS'. The O.K.W. had at first been responsible for service systems only but had not had enough readable material to train its personnel. It had then taken up diplomatic systems and having once tasted blood it refused to leave them. 'Pers.ZS' left all attaché systems to O.K.W. [Comment: Dr. Karstien was clearly at some pains to bring out the interdepartmental rivalry at which other members of the organization had only hinted.]

69. He mentioned a 10,000 group Chinese Code worked on by Dr.Olbricht, who he thought was lucky, as in the days when he himself worked on the Chinese he had to cope with a code book of 40,000 groups.

70. Asked about the application of the experience of the organization to the security of German systems, he said that at an early stage the Germans had progressed so far on a scientific basis that they had little to learn (... 'sind schon früh auf wissenschaftlichen Gebiet sehr weit gekommen, sodass wohl kein Belehrung nötig gewesen'). He mentioned O.R.R. Langlotz (who died two years ago) and O.R.R. Schauffler as having materially contributed to this desirable result. [Comment: see para. 117.]

71. He discounted any assistance received from captured material. He had had occasion to examine captured Czech material and stated that the Czech systems were unbreakable. In reply to the question (in this respect were they unbreakable? he stated that the Czechs used one-time pads. There was, he explained, a difference between systems which were insoluble in practice (owing to lack of time, personnel or equipment) and those insoluble in principle, such as the Czech, Russian and German systems. [Comment: This valuable distinction was much appreciated by the interrogators.]

72. Polish systems he had found unbreakable in practice; there were too many of them. They required more labour than the department had at its disposal. He mentioned a five figure book with a subtractor.

73. The Bulgarians used five figure books of 40,000 groups with frequent repetition.

74. The Lithuanians [illegible] mainly transposition, sometimes double, sometimes single, occasionally enciphered with Vigenère substitution.

75. He had never been concerned with the solution of machine systems.

76. No liaison with foreign cryptographers existed.

77. No intelligence work was done in the department itself on decyphered material, though the selection of material for issue was of course guided by considerations of its possible intelligence value. This selection was done by the Referent [sub-section head] on the basis of knowledge and experience.

78. In the matter of official recognition of work done by the organization he observed that there was none, even from the Minister though, as everywhere, the authorities were quick enough when it came to complaining. [Comment: this question was inspired by the discovery in Dr. Paschke's private papers of a letter dated 30.5.1938 from the Foreign Minister, von Weizsäcker, congratulating Paschke on particularly successful efforts ('besonders erfolgreiche Bemühungen') in the field of work assigned to him.] 'We worked', said Dr. Karstien with some complacency, 'entirely in the dark' ['Wir arbeiteten vollständig im Dunkeln'. Comment: the romantic aspect of this kind of activity appeared to afford him some satisfaction.] It had been different with the Austrian Foreign Office cryptographers, who had been paid partly by results; solution of a difficult problem had been rewarded by a bonus. A former member of the Austrian organization (now dead) had transferred to 'Pers.ZS' after the Anschluss and professed himself dissatisfied with the remuneration in his new employment.

79. Dr. Karstien was dismissed and Herr Zastrow called.

80. Herr Zastrow asked that Professor Rohrbach be allowed to be present at the interview. He was accordingly called.

81. Herr Zastrow is a bookbreaker and has been engaged on U.S. systems for 27 years. The Americans used mainly 5 letter books with 10 recyphering tables for monoalphabetic and bigram substitution to each book. The tables ran for two to six months. Later other substitution tables began to be used, with 5 indicator groups [illegible] table. The tables were changed in the course of a message, the indicator for the new table being encyphered with the previous table.

82. The German designation for these systems was B1, B2, B3 etc., to B10, (B = Buchstabe). American equivalents he remembered were:

[illegible] = A1
B6 = A1
B7 = C1
B8 = Brown Code

The B6 book was taken through physical compromise. The 'Brown Code' had been captured but it had been broken before capture. The reconstruction of the book had taken 2½ years.

83. [illegible] transpositi n system used by the 'Co rdinator f Information Washington' was mentioned. No success had been achieved with this.

86. At one point Herr Zastrow had been lent to the O.K.W. The head of the British or American subsection in the O.K.W. was Obl. Rohrbach, who did the same work as was done in 'Pers.Z' but had more people to do it.

87. Professor Rohrbach was careful to point out that the loan of Zastrow to the O.K.W. by 'Pers.ZS' was a very different matter from the loan of Rave, Hierer and Grosse to 'Pers.ZS' by the O.K.W. Zastrow was an expert and a man of considerable experience, whereas the other three were young men who had to be taught their business. [See para. 50]

88. [Comment: Conversation was carried on in English. Herr Zastrow's speech consisted largely of indistinct mumblings, so that some difficulty was experienced in recording what he said. Prof. Rohrbach informed the interrogators that Zastrow was very difficult to understand even when speaking German.]

89. The meeting was adjourned.

Sixth Meeting; held in the Oratory School on May 21st, 1945, 11 a.m. to 1 P.M.

Present: Professor Vincent (in the chair), Commander (S) Dudley Smith, R.N., Major Scarn U.S..., L. Pohl, U.S..., Dr. Forster, P.O.M. Phipps R.N.V.R., Dr. Paschke, ORR Scarnuffler, Prof. Rohrbach.

90. The main object of this meeting was to obtain information on work done on British systems.

91. In reply to the question whether work was done on Colonial Office, Dominions or India Office systems, Dr. Paschke replied that it was difficult to keep them apart. All unreciphered codes were investigated. India Office traffic was only [illegible] available, which was not often, and in any case there was little material.

92. British unreciphered 4-letter books. The time lag between the introduction of a new book and the reading of enemy traffic varied very much, but in favourable circumstances was as little as [illegible]. Much of [illegible] depended on [illegible] information gathered in the press. They had a subsection for reading newspapers for this purpose but information from the press could [illegible] until the book was already built up to some extent and was then only able to [illegible] partially be [illegible] was found to be [illegible] in some detail. [illegible] which the book was constructed was a valuable help in their reconstruction.

93. British unrecyphered 5-letter books. The time lag in book-building was longer than with the 4-letter books, i.e. 4 to 5 months, but the content of the messages was less important. There were two large books, one in general use, the other principally used for the traffi traffic of the South Africa Government. The first was also used by Siro. These books were of no great importance and were not fully built up.

94. One 4-letter and one 5-letter book were captured in Norway but both were already readable.

95. No recyphered letter traffic was read.

96. British figure systems. They had no captured books, but an out of date recyphering table was captured in Norway, which enabled Dr. Kunze to strip the traffic for a time. Analysis of the captured table gave an idea of the scope and method of recyphering, but they never actually read any of the traffic. The starting points for the subtractor depended on the date and the number of the message.

97. No work was done on figure traffic sent with a 5-letter indicator of the type CVCVC or VCVCV. It contained groups on unrecyphered code in the preamble. No intelligence about order of battle of imilitary authorities etc. was extracted from these preambles in the Auswärtiges Amt, as the O.K.W. had copies of the messages in any case. No assistance in breaking additive recypherments was received from references to previous telegrams made in plain code in the preambles of cypher telegrams.

98. A "five" figure system, Interdepartmental Cypher, was captured in Norway, but the O.K.W. and Göring's Forschungsamt were principally concerned with its exploitation. He thought that the degarbling system had been reconstructed.

99. Dr. Paschke made it clear that although these systems were notrread, there was in fact enough material for them to be readable. When asked whether any assistance was offered the organization in this respect he said that they had to manage with the personnel they had. The acquisition of Hollerith machinery had no connexion with the previous failure to solve British systems. Periodical checks were made to see whether the systems changed but they were convinced that no fundamental change occurred.

100. No work was done on British commercial or Bank of England systems. Dr. Paschke was of the opinion that these were not handled by the O.K.W. either and suggested that Göring's Forschungsamt might have been concerned, as it had contacts in [illegible].

101. Authorities responsible for cryptographic work on Hollerith material: It was made clear at this point that there were three independent parties working on Hollerith problems in Germany - the O.K.W., the Auswärtiges Amt, and Göring's Forschungsamt. The Auswärtiges Amt had close liaison with the Forschungsamt and with the O.K.W.

102. Shift working: Working hours were from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m., though Dr. Kunze's party occasionally did nights. There was always a duty officer available at night. They did not consider shift system because it was difficult to get people who were suitable to work hours of vacuum.

103. Interception: Material came from [illegible] sources:

1. O.K.W., which maintained interception [illegible] Treuenbrietzen and Lörrach. Traffic received by T/P.

2. Forschungsamt, stations not known. Material intercepted by the Post Office, both T/P and L/P, reached 'Pers.ZS' through the Forschungsamt until that was bombed out, after which this type of material came direct from the Central Post Office.

3. 'Pers.ZS' maintained a small interception station of its own in Dahlem, called Landhaus. It was used to cover the more important traffics such as Ankara and Lisbon. London was always very poorly received.

104. The O.K.W. maintained interception stations in occupied countries; he knew of one in the Balkans, one in Greece and one in France. No material was received from diplomatic posts abroad and none from foreign interception services, except some traffic intercepted by the Hungarians which was forwarded through the O.K.W. Nothing was ever received from the Italians or the Finns. In most cases the traffic was copied in the O.K.W. or the Forschungsamt before it reached 'Pers.ZS', so there was no indication of its origin.

105. It was stated that the O.K.W. did no work on British recyphered books.

106. If when a new system was broken it was discovered that traffic dealt mainly with matters outside the diplomatic field, it was handed over to O.K.W. for exploitation.

107. Dr. Paschke was unable to say which British channels produced the greatest number of messages with intelligence value and said that Frl. Hagen could answer this question precisely. [Comment: See para. 41a ff; this lady is ill and is at present detained at Marburg.]

108. On the matter of misuse of low grade systems for the purpose of passing high grade information, Dr. Paschke stated that though in general the intelligence value of the low grade traffics was not high they had carried a number of messages of considerable interest. His impression had been at the time that these messages were passed in that [illegible] the express benefit of the Germans. He recalled a number of messages before the out-break of the war to the effect that Britain would not remain neutral in the event of a conflict between Germany and Poland. He remembered a case about six months ago of a short telegram from London to Berne concerning the burning of a signature to the [illegible] Charter. This message caused considerable interest in Berlin and the cryptographers were asked to check its accuracy, as its meaning was not clear. There was no cryptographic uncertainty about the decypherment, but the text remained obscure and its meaning was never cleared up. [illegible] such messages were known in the Office, principally those concerning [illegible] and minor Powers.

109. [illegible] prefix 'LIVIA'.

[illegible] traffic: The impression was created by Austrian then British [illegible], until for cryptographic reasons, the Austrian material was unable to read. The links were, inter, Lisbon and Sofia were the most important, Stockholm also so. The Berne link passed messages from agents in Germany. Intelligence material was also passed from Finland and Moscow.

111. ORR. Schauffler was asked about his interest in cypher machines. He said he never used any himself, but collected material bearing on the subject.

112. As much as twenty years ago he was interested in the Enigma as a cryptographic device. He mentioned a printing Enigma as existing in those days, which was superseded by the Enigma with lights. The Wehrmacht had taken up this latter model and improved it.

113. The commercial type Enigma used by the Swiss was sometimes solved by stereotyped beginnings and known settings. The Swiss used to include in their messages the machine setting for the next message.

114. He had investigated the Kryha machine and had reported that it was soluble.

115. He had also some knowledge of the 'Geheimschreiber', one of the principal features of which he described as consisting of wheels with adjustable wiring. It was not very satisfactory and Hüttenhain of the O.K.W. Forschungsabteilung [Comment: not to be confused with Göring's Forschungsamt] was continually finding cryptographic faults in it. The Auswärtiges Amt used the 'Geheimschreiber' but the O.K.W. was responsible for the security of the device.

116. When asked where the machines came from which 'Pers.ZS' investigated, he said that they were supplied in order that their security could be tested. Hagelin machines had been investigated by the Wehrmacht and O.K.H. had read material encyphered with them.

117. His own special duty was to ensure that cryptographic possibilities were known and appreciated. He had worked with ORR. Langlotz (see para. 70), Head of the Cypher Security Section of the Auswärtiges Amt, on this subject and was satisfied with the liaison existing with the authorities responsible for German systems.

118. At this point, Dr. Paschke observed that they 'had reason to be convinced of the superiority of German systems' ('Wir waren mit Recht überzeugt von der Überlegenheit der deutschen Verfahren'), with which ORR. Schauffler agreed [Comment: the general context of this remark suggested that 'German systems' was intended to include the machine systems used by the armedforces.]

119. In reply to the suggestion that the advent of machines meant that the great age of cryptography had come to an end, ORR. Schauffler said that the great age had begun with the first world war and was likely to end with the second. It was however worth bearing in mind that at the end of the last war people were saying that the age of cryptography was over.

199a. He felt that the history of cryptography, in which he had a life-long interest, had in this connexion a real function to perform, in that it attracted attention to methods of solution and general cryptographic possibilities. Machines for instance were only insoluble as long as they were well used. The Swiss Enigma had been read because it was badly used. The Wehrmacht had laid down strict rules for the use of the Enigma to ensure that compromise did not occur through improper use. The same applied to other systems.

120. Dr. Paschke on this pair system of a Russian diplomatic one time pad which had been used by the Russian army under conditions which prevented the normal instructions for use to be observed and which was thus compromised. The G.P.U. had used it up to Stalingrad. The pads were used more than once. The traffic was read sometimes on depth of 3 and frequently on depths of 4 or 5. The solution was helped by the circumstance that the Russians always used alphabetical order, as their belief for security on the polyphonic table, on all four figure, the key looks all five figure.

121. Special characteristics of Russian one time pads. Large differences between 5 digit figures were comparatively rare. He had seen specimens of Russian one time pads captured in the field. They had been typed on a typewriter with one carbon. Series of figures (e.g. 34567 etc.) with a difference of 1 were common as other psychological peculiarities of the typist, such as a recognised substitute for zero ('Angst vor dem Null'). The indicators were employed with the first group of the finished telegram. The false sum of the penultimate group was the discriminant.

122. Mentioning the circumstance that the Russian systems changed after the publication of the British White Paper in 1927, ORR. Schauffler remarked that we did not publish the really interesting material at the time and he had never been able to understand why not.

123. Double transposition. When asked about their general success with systems of this kind, Dr. Paschke stated that it was sometimes possible to read them currently, but that it depended on the number of keys. In general he thought, and ORR. Schauffler agreed, that they caused as much trouble to the legitimate users as they did to the cryptographer; they were secure but laborious. American double transposition systems were known to exist, but no work had been done on them.

124. Last War Papers: ORR. Schauffler observed that his homes among the captured material ('Serie 23') contained a collection of material relating to the cryptographic work done by the Germans on British Naval cyphers during the last war.

125. Expansion of the Organisation since its Inception: Exact figures were given as follows:

1918	20 to 30 people
19	50 people
19	80 to 100 people
19 5	180 to 200 people

126. In the previous [illegible] before the adjournment reference was made to the Polish [illegible] could be found [illegible]. Lieutenant [illegible], the 'Pole No. 1' [illegible] Polish and Slavonic languages, who had been last heard of in charge of [illegible] Warsaw Police. He was also anxious to have news of the state of health of Mr. Gruning, who is now in hospital. The Section was unable to provide further information on either of these points.

Seventh Meeting; held in the Oratory School on May 21st, 1945. 2.45 p.m. - 6 p.m.

Present: Professor Vincent (in the chair), Cdr (S) Dudley Smith, R.N., Major Seaman U.S.A., Lt. Fehl, U.S.A., Dr. Forster, P.O. M. Phipps W.R.N.S.
and later: Professor Rohrbach, Dr. Schroeter, Dr. Schultz, Herr Krug Herr Brandes, Dr. Benzing, Dr. Deubner, Dr. Olbrecht, Dr.Müller

127. On the advice of Professor Rohrbach it was decided to divide up up the eight members of the party who had not yet been interviewed into three groups, taking the three gentlemen from Dr. Kunze's party first. It was pointed out to him that the restricted accommodation available did not enable the meeting to ask him to 'sit in' on the interviews, as had been done on previous occasions, and that the presence of section heads at the interviews of members of their sections, which he earnestly requested, would be impossible for the same reason.

128. Dr. Schultz, Dr. Schroeter and Herr Krug were called.

129. Dr. Schultz is a mathematician and statistician by profession. He worked before the war in the Statistisches Reichsamt and was transferred to Dr. Kunze's party in 1939 at the outbreak of hostilities. He had worked on the Japanese machine until 1940 when it ceased to be soluble. It had been broken before he came to work on it.

130. He then worked on the American B7 (C1) code and solved the recypherment. There were 80 to 100 tables, the first of which were difficult to reconstruct, the later ones getting progressively easier. He built up 80 tables himself. When the tables changed, so that the sequence was no longer cvcvc, he continued investigations, but work was discontinued in favour of the American strip '02'.

131. He had assisted Dr. Kunze with investigations on the Enigma machine, and the Swiss enigma was successfully solved.

132. He stated that his interest in these matters was purely theoretical and mathematical and that he had little idea of the intelligence value of the material he investigated. It usually left his hands before it was actually readable, as Dr. Kunze's party was responsible primarily for breaking recypherments.

133. When asked what he considered the greatest methodological achievement of Dr. Kunze's party during his term of service, he said that the '02' American strip was in his opinion the greatest success. It was solved by hand, as at that time they had no machines. ('02 wurde entschlüsselt ohne jegliches Hilfsmittel'). He sketched the method of solution as follows:

This is a copy of the original has been removed under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958.

135. In the autumn of 1934 he had begun work on a Polish system, a 4 letter book enciphered with bigram substitution. This system had been investigated before but work on it had been discontinued for a while. Göring's Forschungsamt had been interested in it but had not seriously tackled the decypherment and had restricted itself to sorting the material. This system was used by the Polish Government in London for communication with Berne, Washington, Cairo and Jerusalem. He had seen no traffic between London and the underground movement in Poland. Dr. Kunze's party was still working on this system at the time of the capture of Zschepplin. Some tables had been recovered and related, but no book-breaking had been done.

136. Dr. Schroeter: Had joined the organisation comparatively later (Göring 1941) and had no intention of 'staying on'. He was a lecturer in mathematical logic at the University of Münster. He had joined Dr. Kunze's party and worked independently on Japanese decypherments.

137. He started work on simple transposition decypherments of codes;

[illegible]

140. Herr Krug is a mathematician and a school-master by profession, who had joined the organisation in 1940.

This is a copy
The original has
been retained under
section 3(4) of the
Public Records Act
1958

This is a copy
[illegible] has
been [illegible]
of the
Public Records Act
1958

old. All this time they had no machines and all work was done by hand.

142. They read no traffic prefixed INDEV, INDEX or AFHA.

143. Hollerith machinery: When Hollerith machinery was finally acquired Herr Krug was put in charge of the subsection which operated it. In reply to the suggestion [Comment: see comment on para. 23] that the acquisition of Hollerith machinery was in some way connected with the failure to continue reading British systems, Herr Krug said that there was no connexion. His next-door neighbour in Berlin-Lichterfelde was a Dr. Koch who was manager of the German Hollerith concern. Friendly conversation with Dr. Koch had set Herr Krug thinking about the application of this kind of machinery to his own work. He had put the project up to his superiors and in due course the equipment had arrived. [Comment: at the First Meeting Professor Rohrbach had suggested (see para. 6) that the acquisition of the machines was due to the personal interest of Ribbentrop]. He said that the OKW possessed no machinery of this kind, but that Göring's Forschungsamt did [Comment: there may be some confusion here between the Forschungsabteilung of the OKW and Göring's Forschungsamt].

144. The machines they had were:

20 'alphabetische Locher' (alphabet punchers)
10 'Sortiermaschinen' (sorting machines)
2 'Kartenmischer' (collators)
2 'Kartendoppler' (reproducers)
1 'Rechenlocher' (number punchers)[Comment: he said this was for multiplying and differencing]
4 'Alphabetische Tabelliermaschinen' (alphabetical tabulators)
2 'Tabelliermaschinen D 11' (calculating tabulators)
1 'Spezialvergleicher' (multipurpose machine designed by themselves)

145. They had designed a number of accessories to these machines. For the sorting machines, they had designed two devices: a 'Kartenzähler' [card counter] and a 'Nummernsucher' [number finder]. The alphabetical tabulators had an attachment which prevented the machine from printing unless there were two or more identical cards. This was useful for finding repeats.

146. The 'D 11' machines were not Hollerith but ordinary statistical calculating machines made by a German firm. [Comment: the 'D 11' is a Hollerith machine. The captured material contains several prospectuses describing it]

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147. The [illegible] machines could print figures, but the calculating machines could only print letters.

149. Dr. Schultze, Dr. Schroeter and Herr Krug were dismissed and Herr Brandes, Dr. Benzing and Dr. Deubner were called.

150. Herr Brandes is a bookbuilder and joined the organisation in 1920. Since 1938 his special field has been the systems of France, Belgium and Switzerland. He was satisfied with his work on the whole but thought that more could have been achieved with more staff.

151. French: they had read recently a de Gaulle system consisting of a four figure book with a subtractor consisting of five digits repeated to the end of the message, changed daily. The code was a hat book which had been revised ('neugemacht') since 1937. It contained a group for 'Général de Gaulle', but this was a later alteration. Common significations had a number of alternative groups; 'du', 'de l', 'des', 'full stop', etc. had up to 10 to 20 groups. The traffic passed on this system was of a fairly high order. It was used with Washington, London, Stockholm, Moscow, Madrid, Chungking, Buenos Aires and Montevideo.

152. He spoke of another French system consisting of a four figure book with letter bigram substitution with limitations. Only 10 letters were involved, so it was easy to convert them into figures. The recypherment was done by tables of 100 bigrams, changing quarterly. The same table would be used on different dates in successive months of the quarter. The bigrams were taken horizontally. Only the Navy used horizontal and vertical substitution together.

153. He mentioned an unrecyphered book which was not broken. It ran concurrently with the system described above and had the same external characteristics.

154. There were several French systems which they did not read.

155. Belgian: They knew four different Belgian systems.

156. The first was a four letter book, used in two forms: 1) a straight alphabetical vocabulary, in which e.g. 'full stop' = UYAK, or 2) in which the groups were transposed within themselves and UYAK was expressed as KUYA. The latter form was the commoner. This book was used with daily changing bigram tables. At first these tables were systematically construct but grew progressively less so until they were finally not systematic at all.

157. The second was a three letter unrecyphered book on which they did not work.

158. The third was a book known to them as KAMI (the code group for 'full stop'). If the groups were rearranged in the form MIKA the book was partly alphabetical. It was recyphered in the same way as the first (KUYA/UYAK) system.

159. The fourth was a four figure code used for traffic with the colonies. The recypherment consisted of transposition of one half of the book group and substitution of the other half. This code could be used as a five figure book, in which case the significations in the second column had to be taken. All the traffic on this book was read.

160. Swiss: Everything was read except the machine, and that was readable for a time.

161. There was a 3 letter code with recypherment by substitution in columns, separate tables being applied to a single letter and the two subsequent letters. The recypherment changed after the 11th,

13th and 26th groups; a letter, recyphered with the previous tables, indicated which tables were to be used for the following groups.

162. He mentioned the 'LB 5' code, a trilingual book with German, French and English editions. An indicator showed which edition was being used. This book was unrecyphered.

163. Dr. Brandes was unable to state the exact dates when the Swiss Enigma was read but said that it was read completely for a considerable time. [Comment: the phrasing of his statement implied that there was also a time when it was partially readable].

164. Dr. Benzing joined the organisation in 1937. He is an orientalist by training, Turkish being his speciality. He worked as a bookbuilder on the systems of the Near Eastern countries. His section was fully occupied with Turkish and Persian, so that although in theory they were also responsible for the Arabic speaking countries, no work was in fact done on them.

165. All the Turkish diplomatic traffic was read. A few short messages sometimes proved difficult. The Turks used a 40 figure subtractor.

166. All the Persian systems were read. They used a three letter book with substitution tables, which often changed. The Persians however always indicated in clear which table was in use.

167. Dr.Deubner: a classical archeologist by profession [Comment: of considerable repute]. Had done excavations in Greece and had a post at the Pergamon Museum in Berlin. Worked on Italian and Greek systems.

168. Italian: asked about Italian systems after the collapse he mentioned a double transposition used by the Badoglio government which was never solved, and a readable unrecyphered letter 'administrative code' used mainly for communications with Berne, and a system known to them as the 'Salzburg-Verfahren' with à 10,000 group ('Element') subtractor. This system was very difficult and was worked on by Dr. Paschke personally. It was seldom broken.

169. Greek: there were three systems, all of which were read:
1) a clear 5 letter book, the fifth letter of which was dummy; this carried most of the traffic.
2) a clear 4 letter book, used mainly for traffic with Berne.
3) a four figure book used with bigram substitution of 30 tables of 100 bigrams each. It was used between London and Moscow, Washington, Cairo and Ankara. Traffic from London amounted to about 1 a day. The bigram tables changed according to the date.

170. They had not received any captured Greek code or cypher documents.

171. They had read no partisan traffic.

172. He stated that there was close liaison with the O.K.H. in his field to eliminate duplication of work.

173. It took up to 8 days to receive traffic from intercept; anf from 1 to 4 more days before translations were issued.

174. Herr Brandes, Dr. Benzing and Dr. Deubner were dismissed and Dr. Olbricht and Herr Müller were called.

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175. Dr. Olbricht is a bookbroker. He took a doctorate in Chinese in 1938 and joined the organisation in 1939, where he worked mainly on Japanese and Manchurian systems.

176. JB 57. Another Japanese two letter book with a recypherment consisting of stencil transposition with mills, which was read for about two years. There was also a variant with substitution recypherment using a table of about 30 alphabets.

177. He confirmed Dr. Schroeter's statements on Japanese systems.

178. Manchurian systems: he mentioned transposition recypherments of a basic Japanese three letter book. There were 366 very small cages, one for each day. If the message was too long to fit one of these cages, it was continued on the cage for the next day and so on. This system was no longer current. Dr. Schroeter had been working on a current Manchurian system, the method of recypherment of which was thought to be the same as before.

179. They had had a captured Manchurian code book.

180. They did not handle Chinese military attaché traffic. A Chinese system called UTI had been solved in 1941-42.

181. Dr. Müller is a private teacher of languages who joined the organisation in 1940. He worked on Scandinavian and American systems.

182. His work on Scandinavian lasted for three months in 1940 when all Scandinavian work was transferred to the OKW. During that time he had worked on a Swedish unrecyphered five figure hat book. Practically no work was done on Danish or Norwegian. He had some unofficial liaison with people at Göring's Forschungsamt who were working on Scandinavian.

183. After he gave up Scandinavian he worked on U.S. systems and corroborated in general the statements of Herr Zastrow on these (see para. 80 ff.) He added that the 'Brown Code' was used for traffic with Berne, Ankara, Kuibyshev, Beyrouth and South American posts such as Rio de Janeiro. He knew of no American system B9 or B10.

184. The meeting was adjourned.

Interrogators' Personal Impressions of Principal Members of 'Pers.ZS'

185. Professor Rohrbach: Heavy diplomatic manner. Forceful character. .. schemer. Hoped to sell 'Pers.ZS' as a going concern to the Western Allies. Spoke some English.

186. Dr. Paschke: [illegible] more dignity than the others. Very diplomatic manner. Was careful to say no more than circumstances demanded. Put up a good show. Nervous type. Spoke some English.

187. Oberregierungsrat Schauffler: Said as little as possible and moreover has difficulty in expressing himself. Appears to be asleep most of the time; this is deceptive. Unworldly academic type. Greatly respected by his colleagues. Understands English.

188. Dr. Kunze: Professional competence apart, rather nondescript. Anxious to please, but often gave evasive answers.

189. The three section heads were obviously prepared for thorough cross-examination, and were somewhat nonplussed by the informal way in which the interrogation developed. Such information as was withheld by the seniors, or rather was not volunteered by them, was, however, easily obtained from subordinates.

190. Dr. Karstien: Cold, dandified and conceited; a 'man of the world'. Had a low opinion of the interrogators, which was reciprocated. Likely to be more affected by intellectual than by moral scruples.
Understands English.

191. Dr. Schroeter: Pleasant academic type, good character.

192. Dr. Schulz: Unworldly academic type; rather frightened of us.
Some English.

193. Herr Krug: An enthusiast for his job, particularly for his machines, and eager to talk about them.
Some English.

194. Frl. Friedrichs: Able woman of strong character, who would cope with the top in any organisation. Probably not too scrupulous. A good ally in any dubious undertaking.
English fluent and idiomatic.

195. Cover names used during the interrogation:

Clifton	=	Dillon
Vincent	=	Wood
Cook	=	
Seaman	=	Seymour
Fehl	=	Mayhall
Dudley Smith	=	Anderson
Forster	=	Macgregor

A P P E N D I C E S.

A: Organization of 'Pers.ZS' as at end of 1943.
B: Organization of 'Pers.ZS' as in April 1945.

These are copies of documents compiled at the request of Lt.Col. Evans by ORR. Schauffler and Dr. Paschke.

A. ORGANIZATION OF 'PERS.ZS' AS AT END OF 1943

Auswärtiges Amt — Durchscheidungen, den 27. April 1945

Abteilung 'Pers.ZS'

A.i.: Entzifferungsdienst für fremde diplomatische Telegramme mit der Bezeichnung "Sonderdienst", verwaltungsmässig der Personalabteilung des Auswärtigen Amtes angegliedert.

Leiter: Gesandter I.Kl. S e l c h o w

Ab Ende 1943 durch Verlagerung von zwei Abteilungen in Ausweichquartiere Aufteilung des Gesamtsonderdienstes in drei Abteilungen, die durch täglichen Kurierdienst miteinander verbunden waren. Dauer dieses Zustandes bis Januar 1945.+)

Hiernach war die Verteilung der Geschäfte wie folgt:

I. Stammabteilung B e r l i n - Dahlem

Leiter: Oberregierungsräte S c h a u f f l e r
und P a s c h k e

a) Schauffler:

1. Japan
2. Systematik und Grundlagenforschung
3. Verwertung der Erfahrungen an fremden Chiffrierverfahren für die eigenen Verfahren des Reichs

b) Paschke:

1. Verwaltung
2. Bearbeitung und Edition von diplomatischen Telegrammen folgender Länder:

a.	Japan, China	ORR Schauffler
b.	Türkei	OR. Scherschmidt
c.	Iran, Afghanistan	LR Dr. Benzing
d.	Italien, Griechenland	OAR Paschke
e.	Frankreich, Belgien, Schweiz	RR [illegible]
f.	Rumänien	LR Dr. Kramer
g.	Jugoslawien	Dr. Krummel
h.	USA	Zastrow
i.	Holland, Irland, Spanien, Portugal, Lateinamerika	Frl. Hagen

3. Information und Nachrichtenkartei Prof. Dr. Horn.

+) Ab Februar bzw. März 1945 [illegible] Verlagerungen der drei Abteilungen notwendig, durch die [illegible] der Verbindungen [illegible] (siehe [illegible]).

II. [illegible] (Riesengebirge)

Leiter: Regierungsrat Dr. K r i s t i a n

a) Kryptographische Aufgaben:

1. Entwicklung neuer Chiffren [Comment: i.e. cryptanalytic hack-building];
2. Bearbeitung, Übersetzung und Lösung von Telegrammen weniger seltener Art
3. Laufende Lösung schwieriger Überschlüsselungen

b) Übungsziele:

a.	Bulgarien, Kroatien, Polen	für Dr. Kristian
b.	Japan, China	Dr. Olbricht
c.	Frankreich, Belgien, Schweiz	Frl. Schröder.

III. Ausweichstelle H e r m s d o r f (Riesengebirge)

Leiter: Oberregierungsrat Dr. K u n z e
Bearbeitung schwieriger kryptographischer Probleme: Diagnose und Lösung neuauftretender Chiffrierverfahren, insbesondere solcher, die einen größeren Personal- und Zeitaufwand oder auch die Verwendung technischer Geräte erfordern.

Ein charakteristisches Beispiel für die Zusammenarbeit der obengenannten drei Dienststellen stellt das Arbeitsgebiet Japan dar; während z. B. in einem bestimmten japanischen Verfahren die Erstlösung der Überschlüsselung in Hermsdorf gemacht wurde (Dr. Schröter), erfolgte die laufende Lösung der weiteren Schlüssel in Berlin (Dr. Olbricht) und wurde schließlich der zugehörige Code in Dahlem entwickelt, wo auch die Übersetzung und Herausgabe der betreffenden Telegramme vorgenommen wurde (OKH Schauffler).

E. ORGANISATION OF 'TBR.B' AB IV APRIL 1945

'Tbr.B' (Senior Branch [illegible] in the Par[illegible] Division; [illegible])

Aufgabe: [illegible] der [illegible] diplomatischer Telegramme fremder Regierungen.

Leiter: [illegible]

Gliederung: (Stand vom April 1945)

I. [illegible], Grundlagenforschung, Hilfsmaschinenbau, Verschiedenes

Referent: [illegible]

II. Sprachlich-kryptologische Abteilung Leiter: ORR Paschke

A. Länder-Referate:

1. Frankreich, Belgien, Schweiz, Holland
Referent: RR Brandes
Vertreter: WHA Frl.Schrader

2. Britisches Imperium Irland, Spanien, Portugal, Mittel- und Süd-amerikanische Staaten, Thailand
Referent: WHA Frl. Hagen
Vertreter: WHA Frl. Wernick

3. Italien, Vatikan, Griechenland, UdSSR
Referent: ORR Paschke
Vertreter: WHA Dr.Doubner

4. Rumänien
Referent: RR Dr. Kasper
Vertreter: WHA Menning

5. Slawische Staaten (ausser UdSSR), Lettland, Litauen
Referent: RR Dr.Karstien
Vertreter: WHA Frl.Friedrichs

6. US, Skandinavische Staaten
Referent: WHA Dr.Mueller, Hans-Kurt
Vertreter: WHA Zastrow

7. Türkei
Referent: ORR Scherschmidt
Vertreter: WHA Burghard

8. Iran, Afghanistan, Arabische Staaten
Referent: RR Dr. Benzing
Vertreter: Frl. Dr.Schimmel

9. Japan, China, Manschukuo
Referent: ORR Schauffler
Vertreter: Dr. Olbricht

B. Büro, Information (Auskunftstelle für die Länderreferate) und Archiv der herausgegebenen Telegramme
Referent: Prof. Dr. Horn

III. Mathematisch-kryptologische Abteilung Leiter: ORR Dr. Kunze

Den 30. April 1945

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TOP SECRET 'U'

ULTRA

D.D.(C.I.)

/12:7

Herewith a copy of TICOM/I.1. [illegible] Colonel Kwang' full report of the exploitation of KUNG and the Jap.A.A. cryptographers.

The reference to lack of liaison with other bureaux (page 11) has been confirmed.

The information about Goering's [illegible] (pages 17 and 18) is helpful and we may eventually get hold of [illegible] and [illegible].

Reference page 19, doubtless N.S.A. will be receiving before long some general, and perhaps specific, requests from the Russians regarding German Sigint captures.

[illegible]

[illegible]

S. 6349

TOP SECRET "U"

TICOM/I.1

FINAL REPORT

of

TICOM TEAM 3

on exploitation

of

BURGSCHEIDUNGEN

TICOM
8 June 1945

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FINAL REPORT TICOM TEAM UNDER LT. COL. EVANS AND LT. COL. NEFF.

(TEAM 3)

INTRODUCTION

This report is divided into the following sections:

1) General History; 2) Administrative History; 3) Exploitation of Subsidiary Targets; 4) Interrogation Report; 5) Documents Report; 6) Report on Hollerith Equipment; 7) Report on Security Measures; 8) Summary and Statement of Unfinished Business.

1) General History.

The main target at BURGSCHEIDUNGEN (BURG for purposes of this report) was passed by the American line of advance about 13 April. The village is a small one, and there was no fighting in it. Except for possible scattered parties moving through the village, the first American Army man to visit the village and the Burg itself was 2d Lt. Alfred G. FENN, Military Government, Kreis Querfurt, Provincial Detachment No. 14, First U.S. Army. Lt. FENN visited the Burg about 18 April and interviewed the owner, Graf von der SCHULENBERG, using Fraulein FRIEDRICHS of the Foreign Office group as interpreter. Lt. FENN learned on this visit that there was a section of the Foreign Office at the Burg, but Fraulein FRIEDRICHS was evasive about it, and the point was not pressed. Lt. FENN had no forces at that time to occupy or guard. He however, was sufficiently impressed to return for further information about three days later, and on this second visit Fraulein FRIEDRICHS and ROHRBACH requested a private talk with him. In this talk they informed him that they were the cryptographic section of the Foreign Office and that they were prepared to discuss their work with appropriate persons. Lt. FENN handled them gently at first and extracted the whole outline of their work from them. At the end he warned them that now that the existence of the unit and its files was known, any destruction of files would be punished by death.

Lt. FENN put his findings into a report to his superiors, G-5, V Corps, and his report was passed to Col. CLEAVES, Signal Officer, V Corps. Col. CLEAVES visited the Burg himself and covered about the same ground with Fraulein FRIEDRICHS and ROHRBACH. On 24 April he communicated by telephone with Director, SID, ETOUSA and at about the same time a guard of the 102nd Cavalry Regiment was posted at the Burg with the principal aim not of restricting the persons within but of preventing the target from being disturbed by friendly forces or liberated slave workers.

On receipt of this telephone call Director, SID, ETOUSA, while notifying war station immediately named a team of personnel then available at Paris, headed by Lt. Col. Paul E. NEFF, SID, ETOUSA, and Lt. Col. Geoffrey EVANS, Intelligence Corps, British Army. (Full lists of personnel in Appendix A.) This team left Paris on 25 April and went by car via Verdun, Wiesbaden, Weimar, and Naumburg (successive HQ'S) to the target, arriving on the morning of 27 April.

The team found the target apparently intact, and the personnel all present. (Full lists of German personnel in Appendix B.) Lt. Col. Evans promptly began interrogation of key personnel, while other members of the team began the examination of documents and conducted interrogation of minor personnel. At the same time arrangements were completed for quartering the team in the ample space available at the Burg.

From the first the members of the team tended to undertake specialties and to assume responsibilities in particular fields. Lt. Col. NEFF handled signals and major matters of policy, which involved a daily 35-mile run to First Army Headquarters at Weimar. Lt. Col. Evans handled interrogations and marshalled the facts arising therefrom for appropriate action. Major BUNDY was primarily concerned with records of the party, with documents in conjunction with Sgt. LORAH, and with security measures. Capt. MacINTIRE was responsible for vehicles and rations, and both he and Capt. ADAMS had a large share in field trips to additional targets. Sgt. [illegible] specialized in dealing with the Germans of the party and the village, and participated in field trips and in matters calling for his excellent command of the language, the last being true of Sgt. LORAH as well. And last but not least Cpl. SCHNABEL, whose knowledge of Allied systems did not apply to the target, made himself invaluable as the indefatigable cook for the team.

On 28 April Lt. Col. NEFF and Capt. ADAMS, by dint of smart detective work and a brisk car chase, located and took custody of PASCHKE and KUNZE, actually removing them physically from the truck in which they were headed for the First Army POW cage. The original arrest of these men had taken place at Zschepplin about 26 April, and was a tribute to the prompt work of Col. CLEAVES, who had learned of their importance in his conversations at the Burg. The men were brought directly to the Burg and interrogated by Lt. Col. EVANS.

On the same day Lt. Col. EVANS completed his interrogation of the Burg party, with particular reference to additional targets of OKW and the Military services. Further work on the documents was done, and in the evening OSLU was drafted, reporting progress and emphasizing the desirability of air evacuation.

The following day, 29 April, was spent in work on the documents, a visit to Halle/Nietleben, and efforts to arrange transportation for the material and personnel to be evacuated. This first visit to Halle/Nietleben, was fruitless, but the transportation efforts began to bear immediate fruit in the shape of a command car, and with the supplements that arrived in later days from various U.S. Radio Intelligence companies the work of the team was not hampered hereafter for lack of this.

Except for documents and a full interrogation of PASCHKE and KUNZE, 30 April was also spent largely in contacts and admin. The contacts, with VII Corps, were essential as this Corps controlled the area of Zschepplin and very shortly after this assumed from V Corps the control of the Burg area itself.

On Tuesday, 1 May, while Lt. Col. NEFF wrestled with the problems of air evacuation as by then planned for Thursday, Lt. Col. EVANS and Capt. ADAMS made the first trip to Zschepplin. They spent the entire day there and gathered all the facts of the situation. BRANDES, GRUMBKY, and ZASTROW were taken into custody and brought to the Burg, and the trailer of Hollerith machinery was located and a guard arranged by the co-operation of the 104th Infantry Division.

Wednesday, 2 May, was marked by the initial visit to Muehlhausen of Capt. ADAMS, who brought yet another captive back with him in the person of ROY. It was quickly realized that he was not quite in the same boat with the others, and he was segregated from the first. Otherwise the day was notable for the arrival of Lt. STRIBLING with the heavy transportation which handled the team's main requirements from that point on.

The next two days were heartbreaking for all members of the team. Arrangements for air evacuation had been completed, Major CADDICK had duly arrived on Wednesday night to act as chief courier, and the material and documents were duly brought to points at and near the field at the proper time. The only hitch was that, because of real or fancied misgivings about the weather, the planes did not leave Paris on either day, and those responsible for them took no steps to notify the team of their non-departure. In order that they should not know that they were to travel by air the personnel were taken only to the outskirts of Kolleda, and it is unlikely that the field ration picnics by the roadside will be soon forgotten by Capt. MacINTYRE, who on successive days bore the burden of escort while the rest of the team waited helpless and frustrated at the airfield. It was therefore with some relief that Saturday morning brought word that the flight was postponed until Monday because of continuing bad weather.

The interval was used for successive visits to Zschepplin on Saturday and Sunday, the 5th and 6th. On the first day admin matters were cleared for the arrest by Counter Intelligence authorities of all the remaining operational personnel, plus the wives of some of those already held. The return trip accordingly found a bag of some forty civilians being held, and seven of these were brought to the Burg on the night of the 6th to be evacuated by air. Some documents and material were also brought, though the bulk had been destroyed. The two days had been used meanwhile to make a security check of the whole of the Burg, and to winnow from the remaining non-operational documentary material any items of incidental intelligence. Plans were also made for security measures against the Russians, and in particular Lt. Col. NEFF succeeded in arranging for the evacuation to Marburg in the eventual American area of all possible civilians with whom the team had been in contact.

The air evacuation finally came off on Monday, the 7th, at 1500. In fact the delay, while extremely trying and potentially dangerous to the smooth co-operation of the Germans, had the good effect of allowing all important personnel to be sent at once rather than by a later trip. In any case the oft-rehearsed routing did not fail, and the departure of the planes carried with it the end of the major intelligence-gathering work of the team.

There remained the Hollerith machinery at Zschepplin, and possible material at Halle/Nietleben, Muehlhausen, and Arnstadt to investigate, and a major logistical problem to solve in the transportation of more than 50 persons and over 200 file cases out of sight of the Russians.

The Hollerith was disposed of on VE day, 8 May. Major Adams, who had arrived from Paris the preceding day, examined it thoroughly and extracted key parts. The remainder was left in the trailer and the whole towed to a vacant field and demolished beyond recognition by the efforts of the pioneer infantry of the 104th Division. As if these fireworks were not enough in celebration, the entire party ended that evening by drinking the local wine from the Graf's tablecloths in the Festsaal of the Burg, with appropriate toasts and additional fireworks with materials available.

On Wednesday the 9th the first convoy of Delitzsch civilians was despatched to Marburg, and Lt. Col. EVANS and Major BUNDY investigated the Halle/Nietleben target with largely negative results. Thursday, while the convoy was returning to reload, Lt. Col. EVANS and Capt. ADAMS investigated Muehlhausen, while Capt. MacINTYRE tried and failed to find anything at Arnstadt. And on Friday the Burg civilians were taken to Marburg, the guard was relieved, and the exploitation completed except for checking and reporting to various headquarters as the team returned to Paris. Major BUNDY, with a last truckload of material, arrived there on 13 May, while the remainder of the team arrived on the evening of the 14th.

3) Subsidiary Targets.

a) MUEHLHAUSEN

This target was visited by Lt. Col. EVANS and Capt. ADAMS on Thursday, May 10. The first action taken was that of depositing Dr. ROY (see interrogation report) at his house, having first obtained from him a complete list of all Pers Z Gen and Pers Z S people who had come to MUEHLHAUSEN from Zscheppelin(Doc K). At the same time I told him to get hold of Dr.GERLACH, who seemed to be the most important of those left. He proved however to have played only a quite minor part in the organisation and I let hi[m] go.

The four locations given us for Pers Z Gen and S material were:

Amtsgerichtsgebäude
Deutschrittersehule
Fritz Sauckelschule
Railway sidings (trucks).

The first of these was the only one which yielded any fruit, and very little at that. There were four green safes of the regular Pers Z type - empty. (Instructions left with C-in-C to dispose of these). Also a certain amount of stationery and a few addressed envelopes. But nothing else.

The Deutschrittersehule, given as a location by Dr.GERLACH, was found to have been used by other sections of the AUSWAERTIGES AMT evacuated to M. And a mission from G.2 Shaef, under Lt.Col. SPENCER (Brit) and Major WEISSENBERGE(US) had put all rooms under lock and key. We managed however to find the appropriate keys and obtained access. The documents, which were very numerous, were all of the Ausw. Amt but none of Pers Z or Z.S. We therefore locked up again and went to the Sauckelschule. Here there were two rooms with Shaef notices on and for one of these the key could not be found. However the other was material of no Sig. Int. importance, and I think it unlikely therefore that Pers Z. S. material will be found. If it is, the office channels should bring it to us in due course.

Finally the railway yards were filled with some 3 or 400 waggons, many looked It was a task quite beyond our time or means to go through these, for material which might or might not be there. We spent nearly an hour on three train loads and found chiefly machinery and G.I. clothes. As all statements have agreed that in any case only personal effects were in these waggons, I think this chase can safely be abandoned.

b). Halle/Nietleben. Heeres- und Luftnachrichtenschule.

Two CHI Sections were evacuated into these buildings.

a). A party of Pers Z. C. who subsequently moved on to Zeppelin.

b). A party from OKW/CHI from Berlin. These numbered some 20 people and the senior man was Obltn ADLER. They worked in Baracke 10 H and Stabsgebaeude 80.

These two buildings were found to be opposite each other and occupied respectively by a supply company and a group of American ex Prisoners of War. Prior to this occupation the buildings had already housed elements of the infantry who first freed the area. The chances of finding anything were therefore extremely slender, and though it was impossible to go through Stabsgebaeude 80 room by room, it can be taken that nothing of interest remains there. All that was discovered was a pile of"Secret" stationery belonging to OKW CHI (samples herewith). This was in a cupboard in the basement and was removed in toto. A list of the names of the people known to have been there was left with C-inC. 7th Corps and they have undertaken to pick these people up for us.

It is worth mentioning that the Heeres u. Luftnachrichtenschule is a vast complex of buildings, many of which are stacked high with electrical apparatus of every sort. We brought away a few papers from one room to indicate the kind of thing that is to be found. If the appropriate authorities are not already aware of this target, action should be taken fairly soon, as hundreds of ex P of W drift around all the time and take what they like.

c). Bad Berka. ARNSTADT.

Information had been given that there might be trucks of Pers Z. S. material in the Railway yards at these two places. An exhaustive search was carried out by Capt. MacINTYRE and nothing found.

4). INTERROGATION REPORT

Interrogation throughout was conducted in German and had as its sole object the eliciting of information about the location and scope of further targets, and the names and likely whereabouts of individuals concerned with them. Out of it arose:

a) A fair number of new targets of varying size.

b). A large list of names.

c) A general picture of the organization both of "Pers Z.S" and of other kindred organizations.

This report falls into two parts. (1) An account of the form the interrogations took and the occasions on which they were carried out. (2) The information derived under the three headings listed above.

I.

April 27

On arrival at HQ V Corps, U.S. Army we contacted Col. Cleaves, Signal Officer of the Corps, upon whose initiative the target had been held and "frozen" pending our arrival. We proceeded at once to Burg S. and were met at the head of the stairs by the senior members of the German party. Col. Cleaves introduced us in English using as intermediary Frl. FRIEDRICHS, a fluent English speaker.

The senior members were:

ORR SCHAUFLER - Head of line section

Prof. Dr. ROHRBACH

Dr. KIRSTIEN

Frl. FRIEDRICHS

They handed us a list of those present in the castle and expressed their desire to give an account of their work and organization. We sat down at once therefore round a long table, and Dr. SCHAUFFLER, prompted by the others, outlined the organization of "FERS Z. S" that is, the Cypher-breaking section of the Foreign Office.

The facts given at this session were later drawn up on paper and presented to me by Dr. SCHAUFFLER (Doc A).

In the course of the rest of the afternoon I interviewed the leading members of the party separately. Besides those listed above these included:

Dr. OLBRICHT

Dr. MUELLER

Hr. GROSSE

HIERER

RAVE

SCHROEDER

Frl. SCHRADER

All were entirely co-operative in giving information on their own work but seemed remarkably ignorant of the work of associated sections - OKH, OKL, OKM, etc. I formed the opinion that they had had a conference prior to our arrival and had decided that they would tell all they knew on their own field but would hold back on anything to do with Wehrmacht.

April 28

Acting on the assumption that the German party were holding back on their knowledge of kindred organizations I called Frl. FRIEDRICHS and explained to her that their account of their own organization was excellent, but that I was astonished at the lack of liaison between them and their colleagues in associated departments, and would like a fuller account of this. I told her to put this point to their senior members and come back to see me in a few moments. She returned very shortly after with Dr. NEBEL and the gist of what they said was this:

The lack of liaison was indeed remarkable and to them had always been a matter of regret and vexation. But the fact was they they kept strictly to themselves, as did also each kindred department, partly for security reasons, partly from interdepartmental jealousy. Dr. ROHRBACH then assured me that they were perfectly willing to try and get together a concerted picture together of the sum total of their knowledge in the respect demanded, and asked me if I would agree to having a round table talk after lunch, instead of questioning them individually. I agreed to do this.

At this conference, which lasted most of the afternoon, were present: SCHAUFFLER, ROHRBACH, KARSTIEN, FRIEDRICHS, GROSSE, HIERER, RAVE, SCHROEDER. The four latter were brought in as having worked into OKW/CHI. From this conference a great deal of extra information was forthcoming about OKW/CHI, and a certain amount on other CHI organizations. (See Part II of this report).

My view at the time as to the attitude of the German party was that originally there was an intention to stick to Foreign Office matters, but that this was abandoned as soon as they saw that they were going to be pressed to go beyond the point.

In the evening about 7 o'clock Col. Neff arrived with Drs. PASCHKE and KUNZE whom he had managed to trace after a good many vicissitudes and adventures. I at once interviewed these two and found them quite ready to help, though extremely tired after a day of travel. I left them for later interview but asked them to let me have by the morning a list of all personnel serving or having served under them with locations as far as possible. This was handed to me the next day (Doc C).

April 30

The morning was taken up with an interview of Dr. PASCHKE and KUNZE. They were completely co-operative and added a great many personalities to the list of those already secured, at the same time clarifying the organization of the whole. There is no doubt in my mind that PASCHKE is the most effective member of the whole party, while SCHAUFFLER, who is on the same level of seniority, is more the "absent-minded professor". This view was confirmed later in the afternoon of this day when Dr. ROHRBACH (who has throughout been the "Wortführer") came to ask if he could borrow back the original table of organization drawn up by SCHAUFFLER (Doc A) in order to emend and amplify it under Dr. PASCHKE's guidance. This they did and the result is Doc B. The difference between the two is to be understood as the difference between the full peace-time set-up of the office (B) and the emergency set-up resulting from the vicissitudes of war (A).

On the evening of the 4th May I was approached by one of the subordinate office workers, Frau SCHADEWALDT, who claimed that Dr. PASCHKE was exerting his influence against co-operation with us; she alleged also that he had reproached Dr. ROHRBACH with his failure to destroy their documents and finally that he had been in with the Party and possibly a member. Acting on the assumption that this information was substantially true we put PASCHKE under separate detention, in which he remained until his time to set out for the airfield. On the evening of Saturday, May 5th, I had an hour's talk with him, in which, without mentioning Frau SCHADEWALDT or any specific source, I suggested that his attitude was less co-operative than that of the others and left something to be desired. He denied firmly that he had in fact brought any pressure to bear on the others in the direction suggested, and gave the following account of his position:
he had the choice, when captured, of two courses - either to maintain complete silence or to accept the inevitable consequences of Germany's defeat and to adopt the attitude which is accepted in such circumstances as honourable and which is characterised as "Loyalität". This word corresponds in meaning to "loyalty" only in so far as it implies the faithful carrying out of conditions imposed by force majeure, and it indicates the same kind of attitude as that of the prisoner of war who gives 'Parole', but covers a wider sphere of action.

He added that the only respect in which he could consider my suggestion to have justification was in his feeling, as a former officer, that they would be wanting in self respect if they came rushing "mit fliegenden Fahnen und offenen Armen" into our camp. He did feel, he admitted, that a certain reserve of personal behaviour was appropriate so long as the war was still being fought, and he mentioned that in this respect he had suggested to the others that, as non-fraternisation was the order on the Allied side, then it should be the same on their side too. Summing up I would say that PASCHKE will co-operate fully in so far as knowledge which is available is concerned, but that he should be questioned exhaustively on matters which he as the senior man will have and the others not.

The work concluded with the interrogation of Dr. ROY (May 9). This man was head of the Personnel Department of Pers Z office and as such was concerned with administrative problems for the whole office, not merely Pers Z.S. He claimed that his connections with Pers Z.S. were slight and that he had no special knowledge of their work. On the other hand it is of course clear that he knows what their work was. I had had a short interview with him on the evening of his arrival from Muehlhausen (April 28) and found then that he was not specifically a Pers Z.S. man. We decided then therefore (acting on the lines indicated in OLSU/) to drop him back in the pond at the earliest possible opportunity. Pressure of the work made this impossible until Friday, May 11, and on the morning of the 7th I took the opportunity of a full talk with him.

He was a good deal firmer in his attitude than the rest have been here, but ultimately gave a quite useful picture of the organisation of Pers Z. showing the position of Pers Z.S. in the whole. (see below). He also provided a complete list of all those members either of Pers Z. Gen (his section) or of Pers Z.S. who found their way from Zeppelin to Muehlhausen. (Doc K). In the course of a one day visit to Muhlhausen I sought out one of these (Dr. GERLACH) and had a brief talk with him. He was in KUNZL's party but seemed to have played no outstanding part. I therefore let him stay where he was. If it is desired to follow up the Muehlhausen contacts this can be done in due course but I do not think that there is anything of note to be added to our knowledge by so doing. (See separate report on Muehlhausen visit).

Information from interrogation of Dr. ROY, May 7.

Abtlg Pers Z was formerly Abtlg I (Eins) of the Foreign Office, i.e. the normal Admin Section. Acquiring work of Pers Z.S. type it changed its name, giving cipher work the general cover of a "Personell" Dept. It is divided thus:

GESANDTER

SELCHOW

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Pers Z.S. ORR PASCHKE SCHAUFFLER	Pers Z.F. ORR HOFFMAN	Pers Z. CHI. ORR HAUTHAL	Pers Z.GEN. DR. ROY

(2) Concerned with all questions of communications-telephone, T.P. etc.

(3) Concerned with production of Foreign Office own cyphers.

(4) Concerned with Personnel and Admin problems for the whole.

General Observations:

The question that naturally suggests itself is: Why did these prisoners all talk so freely? The answer is partly to be found in the course of events leading to the discovery of the whole party. (See first page of the General History of Events). And might be summed up as follows:

(1) Desire to be considered as scientists, having a pride in their work, and prepared to share results with other scientists in the same field, as is done in medicine, etc. This viewpoint was strongly put by ROHRBACH.

(2) "Germany is no more. One cannot harm what does not exist". These were SCHAUFFLER's opening words at our first session. They indicate the lines on which the members have cleared their consciences in regard to breaking the oath of secrecy.

(3) Fear of the Russians.

(4) Desire to improve their present position, get in well with us, retrieve something out of the disaster.

My approach to the prisoners has been friendly throughout - with a short break when insisting on more information about OKW - and I think more can gained by maintaining this attitude than by adopting a formal or threatening one. I would suggest that ORR SCHERSCHMIDT, who is at present somewhere in regular PW channels, be kept separate from the others until all are together where microphone apparatus is available, and that then full use be made of this.

II

A) NEW TARGETS (including Ticom Targets already known)

1) Pers Z.S. (Auswärtiges Amt)

These have all been cleared up now with such exceptions as are noted in the Reports.

2) O K W

This SigInt organisation, originally situated in the Haus am Runden Platz, Potsdamerstrasse (no mention of Wilmersdorf) had up to 400 people, and was largely concerned with diplomatic material. In spite of this, liaison with Pers Z.S. seems to have been very slight. The bulk of the information supplied is available owing to the fact that a) Paschke is a senior enough official to know something of other organisations b) there were 4 members of OKW on attachment to Pers Z.S. at the time of capture. Besides the main offices there was an office in the Margarethenstrasse near the Potsdamerstrasse, and a house out at GRUENEWALD.

Targets from this complex are:

1. A party under Obltn ADLER, which evacuated to the Heeres nachrichtenschule NIETLEBEN near HALLE (See Doc G). See Section 3 of this report.

2. There was talk of CHIEMSEE as location for a main move. This would probably imply the Fraueninsel, an island in the middle of the lake with a large monastery on it.

3. Other reports mention TRAUNSTEIN; but evidence here is very vague.

4. It is possible that Dr. HÜTTENHAIN, machine specialist for OKW, and his party were with ADLER at NIETLEBEN, (See Doc G)

3) O K M

- went to Panzergrenadierkaserne EBERSWALDE (confirmation of Ticom location). Names of senior cryptographers were: Oberregrat FRAIKE and DR. TRANOW.

4) O K L

1) POTSDAM location confirmed.

Specialist for American/English given as: Regierungsrat VÖGELER

His department thought to be about 30 strong. Also in the dept.: Herr VOERMANN (cousin or nephew of the Ambassador).

2) The existence of a rival SigInt Luftfahrtministerium organisation, under GÖRING's control, is stated. It has the title FORSCHUNGSAMT and was situated in CHARLOTTENBURG. For names and general set-up see Main Section C of this Report. KAUFBEUREN is mentioned as a possible present location.

5) O K H

JÜTERBOG location confirmed. Only very few names known, as follows:

BEILOWITZ, KOCHENDORFER, STEINBERG, (later under Hütterhain at Okw), METTIG (admin. Officer, later to Okw)

Insp KÜHN (only a recruitment officer)

6. Gesandter SELCHOW

- head of the whole organisation since 1919, last known to be in SALZBURG, sent instructions on the Friday after Easter mentioning move to BREGENZ. A waggon of his personal effects was found in the Courtyard of the Castle of Zschepplin. These were looked through carefully and no papers found.

7. Y-Stations

In charge: Oberstltn KÄHLER

The following were given:

CHI IIIB BERLIN: formerly in charge of Prof. Dr. PONSCHAB.

TREUENBRIETZEN - west of JÜTERBOG

LAUF - near NÜRNBERG

DAHLEM - known as "Landhaus D", only few sets.

LÖRRACH - in Baden

Under Forschungsamt:

B - BRESLAU, LEBA, LÜBBEN, TEMPLIN

Also external stations at MADRID and PLOVDIV.

C)

1. Outline of Organisation of Pers Z.S.

The best picture of this, together with names of personalities is given in Doc B. Compare also with Doc A, which is, however, not accurate.

2. Outline of FORSCHUNGSAMT Organisation

This organisation which was controlled by GÖRING and came under Luftfahrtministerium was at first in the Schillerstrasse Berlin/Charlottenburg; then moved to Breslau; where they were in the Hartlieb Barracks; then to Jüterbog; finally Southwards. The suggested ultimate location is KAUFBEUREN, but this is by no means certain.

Head

Min Rat SCHRÖDER

ORR WÄCHTER	ORR SCHULZ Deputy - Dr. HAUMER	ORR WENZEL	DR. PATZEL
Covered Turkish USA English Jap - Dr. AUSTER THOMAY China KIRSCHNER Ireland (Spain (Portuguese	Covered French Italian) RR Roumänien) ENGELKE Vatikan	Covered All Star languages and Greek also in section Hr. TONDORF RR LEHR (Hollerith) Tschinter	Mathematical Section corresponds to HUTENMAIN of O K W

3. Outline of O K W Organisation

This organisation, which was situated in the Potsdamerstrasse and was 300-400 strong, is thought to have moved South to the CHIEMSEE.

Titular Head

Oberstlin HÖPFNER

(He succeeded very recently to the former head: Oberst KETTLER. All knew the latter, none are very certain of the name HÖPFNER. but think that is the accurate form). Previous head to KETTLER was Oberst KEMPF)

Secretary to Head

FRL KUHNERT

Active Head

Min Rat FENNER



Table (A)

English/U.S.A.	ORR ROHEN Size 40-50	Dr. WEISSE, RR SCHULZ, RR DENKER joined later by a Dr. Petersen
French	ORR HELMUT MÜLLER Size 20.	Obltn KUNZE M. later in Halle Herr GEHLING
Bulgarian	Min Rat ROTTER very small	
Jugo-Slavia	Min Dir WENDLAND small	
Roumanian	Major LENSCHAU 6	
Spanish	RR Dr. KIEFER small	
Turkish	RR LOCKER 10	Deputy WITTE also GEMPERLE
Scandinavian	RR WEVERING 6	
Italian	ORR RAFFEL 35-40	
China Japan	Obltn ADLER - (Schröten) "largish group"	
Poland	WHA BERNDT	
Greek	Min Rat SEIFFERT	
Switzerland	Hr. JUNG-FISCHER	

also active on more or less independent footing:

Dr. POSTGEN, BRUCKMANN, RÜSING Griechisch.

Table (B)

Bau Rat ROTSCHEID	had job of constructing machines. Under him a group of technicians (soldiers)
Prof Dr. FRANZ	mathematician. Head section of 15-20 functioned fairly independently went on to HALLE
Prof Dr. WEBER	Specialised in Polish
Prof Dr. AUERMANN	Mathematician } Colleagues of ROHRBACH
" " WITT	" }
Oberstltn PASSOW	in charge of supply, servicing etc. of Hollerith.
Obltn STEIN	Agents messages. Links with OKH
Obltn VAUCK	worked on French agents' traffic section of 50
Ob Insp. MENZER	worked mostly on his own. Construction of German machines and processes. Constructed machine for Japan (?) Head 4-5 men

5). REPORT ON DOCUMENTS FOUND AT BURGSCHEIDUNGEN.

INTRODUCTORY ---- the handling of documents at this target has been affected to some extent by the unusual factors present in the general target situation. The target was taken intact, and the personnel still in it had not used the complete opportunity they had had to destroy all papers. Thus, although the personnel continued to be in the same building, the exploitation was as if they had been removed and was leisurely rather than hasty. The co-operation of files and giving details of the contents for the inventory. (Personnel were not permitted to go through any documents in this procedure.). In view of this attitude the files were not impounded immediately, but some were left in the work rooms for the first two days. The great bulk were from the first in the locked cellar and were moved from there directly to a guarded room, so that their security was complete.

The total material on hand comes under three heads:

a). Steel file cases, about 4 and one half cu ft. There were altogether about 170 of these, of which all but 20 ~~XXX~~ were in the locked cellar.

b). Crates of work material. There were five of these in the locked cellar.

c). Personal luggage. There was a very large quantity of personal luggage, both in the cellar and in the rooms of the Burg.

The German personnel have assured us that all this luggage is in fact personal, and it has not been ransacked for official papers. Had concealment been desired it appears certain that a better method would have been found.

Similarly we have accepted the word of the German personnel that the material turned over to us is in fact the whole of the working material at the Burg. To have accepted otherwise would have been to undertake a systematic search of an enormous building with great facilities to hide material, and of the surrounding grounds. In addition to the basic fact that the personnel had at least a week

before the Burg was guarded effectively, there has been at least one other manifestation of their good faith in the turning over of an overlooked file containing moderately important material and of moderately important work notes left lying on a table and also overlooked.

Procedure The documents were examined rapidly on the first day and numbers chalked on those stated to be work material by Frl FRIEDRICHS and Dr. ROHRBACH. Only a few of the files were opened at this time.

In succeeding days the files in the cellar were taken up systematically to a guarded room upstairs and there examined. Only those files were excluded which contained material of an entirely personal nature and hardly likely to relate to work, such as clothing, food, rugs, etc. After the first few these were not ran-acked. Files containing personal letters and books were looked at more thoroughly, and in some cases personal documents, especially if administrative, and personal books, especially if related to linguistics, were removed to another file and noted. The problem of selection in such cases is not any easy one, and it is possible that mistakes were made. However, it was noted that with the one exception of of the files of BRANDES there was never any mixing of personal and work documents other than reference works and dictionaries. On the evidence of Herr PASCHKE'S effects as found at Zschepplin it appears likely that the files containing personal effects were actually kept in private dwellings and not in the office at all.

There were no keys for two sets of locks, and these had to be broken. The contents were transferred intact, except as noted, if found of interest, to an empty or personal file with a good lock.

In a few cases, specifically the files of PASCHKE, Frl SCHRADER and Dr. KARSTIEN and the files located in the large work room, the file was opened in the presence of the person to whom it belonged. If it contained work material this was described, leading to a considerable saving of time.

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In the end the process ofselection narrowed down the files deemed essential to 73, and these, plus the 5 crates, constitute the first shipment.

Priorities After the necessarily hasty examination of all files it appeared that there were none of such immediate vital interest as to deserve special handling at once or an attempt to evaluate the contents if delayed.

Two priorities were assigned, A and B. In the case of Pers Z.S. documents containing cryptographic work this was based on a rough balance of skill apparent, importance of the country so far as known, and recent date. More difficulty was experienced in grading the Pers Z. files, non-cryptographic but geheim and looking potentially valuable, and many of these were given an A. The packing crates were all given A as three contained onetime pads, and it was thought that all should be handled together. It was thought that the files would be shipped at once in any case.

Records In the first hasty examination some files were given chalk numbers, and these numbers are the basis of the list in the first blue notebook. The use of chalk was unfortunate, for when the files were moved upstairs systematically some of the chalk numbers rubbed off, and new numbers, in sticky paper labels, were given to some cabinets, leading to blank numbers in the original series derived from the chalk numbers.

The blue notebooks were the first systematic record and were intended to cover every file. However, in the end many empty files in the cellar were omitted from the total, and some of these were in fact substituted for original files which had been jimmied. (Notes being made in the blue notebook when this was done).

After the documents for shipment had been selected a second and somewhat briefer register was compiled in the form of index cards, one per file, to accompany the files in whatever manner they were shipped and to be used by couriers in checking them. These index cards were carefully checked with the blue notebooks. In a few cases there is added information on them so that one should not be used to the exclusion of the other.

Sealing and Shipping. The question was raised of sealing all files with references to American or British work. As there seemed no sure way of using sealing wax and as there were no facilities for baling the files with wire, it was finally decided not to do this. It was felt that the fact that the files were of steel and locked, and would be handled under direct supervision at all stages in fairly small quantities, provided sufficient security. The nine files which might have been so sealed have been so noted on their index cards, and a special watch kept on them in loading and shipping.

All the files were removed from their guarded rooms at the Burg directly to waiting vans, with no waiting and no lying around, and under officer supervision at all points. The same handling is expected at the air field and in unloading.

Summary It is believed that this first shipment contains every document of direct cryptographic interest, and every document that seemed in the slightest degree likely to have indirect cryptographic or administrative interest. In other words these files are thought to contain all the original work of these people, all the collateral material used in the work, and all the documents produced by them having any possible intelligence bearing -- down to and including the air raid rosters! The question asked was not "Is it important?" but "Does it relate in any way to the work or to the organisation?".

6) REPORT ON HOLLERITH EQUIPMENT--

1. At the time the equipment was abandoned by the Germans it was apparently being moved to its first operational location, as the machines had never been used. The machines had been rendered inoperative but had not been destroyed. Most of the machine wiring had been cut, and all easily removable parts, blue prints, diagrams, etc.,had been removed. No punched cards were found; a few blank cards were found but there was no card form printed on them.

2. This is a detailed list of the equipment found:

4 Alphabetic-numeric key punches. These machines were of standard German design, with pluggable skip and ejection. Both alphabetic and numeric keyboards were wired for standard punching.

1 Card counting sorter. Regular horizontal sorter equipped with 15 veeder counters for recording the card count of each punch position, reject count, and minor and grand totals.

1 Sorter with Multiple Column Selector. Regular horizontal sorter equipped with mechanical type multiple column selector designed to select any pre-determined punched combination within ten adjacent card columns. This selector was badly damaged and some of the parts removed so that it was impossible to ascertain whether it had any special features.

1 Collator. Standard machine, manufactured by Compagnie Electro Comptable of France. Machine was not equipped with a counting device.

2 Reproducers. Standard machines, of German design, one equipped with summary punching. However, the cable plugboard would not fit the receptacle in the tabulator.

1 Multiplier. Standard German design, equipped with six banks of counters.

1 Alphabetic tabulator. Standard American machine manufactured before 1937. Equipped with 80 counters and an automatic carriage of apparently Italian manufacture. No special features.

3. As many of the relay assemblies, plugboards, counters and parts were removed as was possible in the time available. Two of the key punches were taken, and also all removable machine covers that had the organizational designation painted on them. The rest of the equipment was destroyed using dynamite and thermite bombs.

4. Detailed study of the machines and parts had not revealed any special features. The conclusion is that the machines were to be used for standard statistical work.

sgd. R. W. ADAMS. MAJ. S.C.

7) REPORT ON SECURITY MEASURES.

a) Against the Germans.

From the first it appeared hopeless to prevent other Germans connected with the organisation from finding out about the exploitation of both Burg and Zschepplin. That the units were located at these places was known both to other people in the work (of whom one, Dr. LEHMANN, had left Burg a week before the guard was posted) and to relatives and friends of the members of the units. Later inquiries are almost inevitable, and any of the unrelated persons remaining both at Burg and at Zschepplin could supply enough hints to make the entire picture perfectly clear.

A more concrete problem was that of preventing the personnel who were detained from finding out much about Allied Signal Intelligence organization and scope. Unfortunately the ground had been cut from under our feet on this by the nature of both Lt. FENN's and Col. CLEAVES' conversations with the Germans before the arrival of the team. It had been made clear to the Germans that a group of their opposite numbers were arriving to handle them, and Col. CLEAVES made this very statement in introducing all the officers of the team by name on the first day.

From that point on the members of the team adopted aliases and did their utmost to impress the fake names on the Germans. This proved a difficult front to maintain, with the many articles bearing true names and with blunders into the bargain, and it is likely that the Germans knew our right names at all times and were probably deriving a little quiet amusement from the attempt to conceal them.

The team was more successful in concealing the nature of the cryptanalytic work in which its members were engaged. Both in interrogation and in the examination of documents technical matters were avoided entirely. The priorities given to particular files were carefully concealed, and there was no hint of what the team considered important in its exploitation.

In addition complete security measures were taken for all notes and files compiled by the team itself. The original members of the team occupied two adjoining rooms. One of these was entered daily by a cleaning woman, and at this time all papers were removed from it or an officer sat in the room. The other room was used only by the team and contained the main team files at all times when work was not in progress. Both rooms were looked at all times when not in use. Moreover the nature of the ground plan of the house was an aid to security, as the guard, drivers, etc. were in the third room on the same row and were passing by the team's doors at all hours, while the German Foreign Office personnel were in another wing entirely and the only Germans regularly in this wing were the kitchen and cleaning staff of the Graf.

It may be queried why the house was not emptied of both the Foreign Office personnel and the 40-odd relatives and servants of the Graf who remained there throughout the exploitation. The answer is, that the cards were already on the table when the team arrived. All the Foreign Office personnel knew that they were going to hand over all files, and if they were in good faith on this the rest was incidental, with a guard present and proper security of the work of the team. The Graf's household was composed entirely of women and children, except for three old men and one effeminate middle aged one. The Foreign Office stated that they had always kept the nature of their work a complete secret from the household, but even if this had not been so it appeared incontestable that the members of the household could have done what harm they chose before the arrival of the team. If they were moved out of the Burg they could still get a clear idea of the team's activities by watching movements through the village. As with the Foreign Office personnel the guard and the elementary security measures taken appeared sufficient to prevent any interruption of the work of the team. An additional reason, in retrospect, is that to have taken over the Burg would have been to cause even wider publicity and possibly to bring the exploitation to the notice of the Russians when they moved in. In any case the fact is that the status quo left by Lt. FENN and Col. CLEAVES was maintained throughout, and so smoothly that it appears unlikely that it involved any real danger to security.

b). Against the Russians.

+Although aware that the Burg lay in an eventual Russian area, the team was at first so occupied with the job of intelligence gathering that it did not give full consideration to the necessity of screening the pinch from the Russians. When the matter was first raised by higher authority the team's reaction was that it was impossible to screen, so full had been the publicity surrounding the exploitation.

After much thrashing, however, a basic security formula was evolved and action taken accordingly. This formula was that if the Russians got on the trail at all no security measures could prevent an alert intelligence service from finding out what had taken place. What was required, then, was that the obvious evidences should be removed or so far reduced that they would be removed by the Russian infantry in its first occupation.

Action along these lines was concerned with two elements, personnel and material which bore the imprint of the unit or might be considered so peculiar as to call for investigation.

In the case of personnel that action taken was to evacuate almost all civilians in both Zschepplin and the Burg to Marburg in the American area. This included not only members of the unit but relatives, especially of those evacuated to England. A full list of the German personnel encountered is given in Appendix B, with disposition of each, and an examination of this list will show that only a handful of ladies, mostly old and some sick were left at Zschepplin, and none at all at the Burg. The standard used was a rough and ready one to some extent; wives were taken but the mistress of one of those evacuated to England was left in Zschepplin. In the end it was felt that the persons left at Zschepplin were few and ordinary enough not to rouse suspicion, especially as most of them were working in the military hospital there as attendants.

15(a)

MMD
FR. D-5

TOP SECRET "U"

ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1942 FOR SECTION DEALING WITH BRITISH EMPIRE, EIRE, FINLAND, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, AND LATIN AMERICA. (1/2/43)

BRITISH EMPIRE

GREAT BRITAIN

The following were worked on:-

a) British letter codes.

1. "B22", a 5-letter alphabetic (systematisch) code-book+. ((Translator's note: "B" = Buchstabe= letter.))

2. "B25", a 4-letter batted code-book.

3. "B30", a 4-letter batted code-book, which, with slight variatio ns, is built up in the same way as "B25". A change has taken place in the method of lettering (Buchstabierverfahren) which is done in "B30" with a "simple T26" (=? batted alphabet, or ? simple substitution.). We began working on the book in the spring of 1942, but put it aside soon afterwards owing to the urgency of other tasks. We began work on it again in October 1942 and by the end of the year we had ~~established the significations of~~ recovered 1000 groups. On 21/11/42 we were able to publish the first telegram. However the volume

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+ A more detailed account of all the code-books and ciphers mentioned in this report which were in use before February 1942 can be found in the "Annual Report" for ~~1942~~ 1941 and in the "Cryptographical Report" of 1/2/42.

of traffic has become so small and the contents so uninteresting that we are no longer working on it very intensively.

4. "Z31", a 4-letter lettod code-book of 16,000 groups, which is built up in almost the same way as "Z65". The book has been in use since 1st May 1942. The preparatory stages of the work were done in the same month and in June we began the actual work on the book. By the end of 1942 we had ~~decoded~~ recovered 2,500 groups. We were able to publish the first telegrams in October 1942. In the case of this book,too,the traffic has sunk a great deal and the contents of the telegrams have greatly diminished in value since the book was first used.

b) British figure cyphers.

The "[illegible] CODE"((sic anglice)). As the volume of traffic was slight and the subtractor tables (Additionsreihen) supplied by the (German) Air Ministry consequently enabled us to read fragments of a mainly uninteresting text, only after great delay, we ceased work on it in the summer of 1942.

The following were not worked on:-

a) British figure cyphers (with the exception of the ZDC).

b) A consular system in [illegible] and LAS PALMAS traffic, consisting of a transposed clear-text. According to report by Herr Oberregierungsrat [illegible] of the F.A.(Forschungsamt) in February 1942, unsuccessful attempts to break it were made there.

c) The "INDIAN CODE"((sic anglice)), a 5-letter alphabetic code-book, which has been partly recovered (angeblich), but was put aside, for lack of sufficient depth.

4-letter batted code-book of about 17,000 groups, put aside , as we have not

sufficient depth to work on at present.

AUSTRALIA

Worked on:-

"B22" (See GREAT BRITAIN para. a)2.)

CANADA

Worked on:-

"B22" (See GREAT BRITAIN para. a) 2.)

SOUTH AFRICA

Worked on:-

a) "B22" (See GREAT BRITAIN para. a) 2.)

b) "B23" , a 5-letter alphabetic code-book.

Not worked on:-

A letter code used in traffic with STOCKHOLM, from which only 7 telegrams have come in during the year.

In 1942 546 (decoded) BRITISH EMPIRE telegrams were published.

EXCHANGE WITH OKW, OKH AND F.A.

At the end of August 1942 the "B31" code-book (about 1,500 groups) and at the beginning of November the "B30" code-book (about 750 groups) were passed to OKW for copying. Since then a regular exchange of newly recovered groups for "B31" has been taking place between OKW and Para. Z.S.

The "B31" code-book (2468 groups recovered) was passed to OKM on 16/12/42 for copying.

Contact was established with the F.A., at the wish of CBR WASHINGTON, in February 1942. This did not, however, go beyond a general exchange of ideas. The only concrete result was a list of about 50 recovered "B30" groups which the F.A. gave us.

EIRE

Worked on:-

a) "B22" (See GREAT BRITAIN a) 2.)

b) "B22" recyphered (on a substitution system).

Not worked on:-

A figure cypher, owing to lack of depth.

In 1942 126 (decoded) Irish telegrams were published.

The rest of this report, about six pages, is not reproduced here. It consists of short reports similar to the above on the diplomatic codes and cyphers of THAILAND, PORTUGAL, BRAZIL, SPAIN, ARGENTINA, BOLIVIA, CHILE, MEXICO, PERU, URUGUAY, VENEZUELA and other South-American countries.))

G.C.C.S. (S.A.C.)
11th June 1945.
M.G.F.

[redacted]

m/1826

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Copy to [redacted])

With reference to my D1/1206 of 26th May and D/1819 of 29th May, herewith a copy of the minutes of the ninth meeting with the "Iera 26" cryptographers of the German Foreign Office.

The fact that they appear to have achieved next to nothing with any British civil high grade system does not necessarily imply that the Germans as a whole had no such success; we are still largely in the dark regarding the work of Goering's private "Forschungsamt" and of the Wehrmacht (OKW/OKH).

Reference the attached minutes :-

para 3. X Code took about 3 months to build and cribs were used after identification.

para 4. G.T.C. and the South African "C.I.C." of "no great importance".

para 5. X Code and G.T.C.

para 7. The R.T. captured in Norway appears to have been No.3, only Number 143, a photograph of which we found among the captured documents. It seems to have come from [redacted] Consulate at Bergen.

para 9 to 10 Inter-departmental Cypher said to be the annihilation of the other two bureaux. Here again the documents include a photographic copy of Inter-departmental Cypher 1936, Copy number 673.

para 11. [redacted] will have to be [redacted] as on I-D.

para 16. This should not be accepted as an authoritative statement.

turn over

para 18. Fraehlo added that in any case it was the American unrecoded books which really produced good intelligence, not the British. Arrangements will be made to interrogate Fraulein Hagen in due course.

para 19. Presumably no intentional use of low grade codes was in fact made by the Foreign Office.

para 20. In answer to a question. (J.I.C. long subtractor system).

para 22. (Bottom of page 4) Russian "o.t.l." read as top of three.

para 25. Fraehlo's attitude to Double Transposition.

para 26. These papers are now in my possession - entirely in M.I.5. and not very legible - but will be translated in due course.

The afternoon session (seventh meeting) produced some further information on British Foreign Office long subtractors, but the minutes have not yet appeared.

31

Meetings held with German Cryptographers in the Oratory School on May 21st, 1945.

Sixth Meeting, 11 a.m. to 1 p.m.

Present: Professor Vincent, Commander (S) Dudley Smith, R.N., Major Seaman U.S.A., Lt.Fehl, U.S.A. Dr. Forster, P.O.M. Phipps W.R.N.S. Dr. Paschke, ORR Schauffler, Prof. Rohrbach.

1. The main object of this meeting was to obtain information on work done on British systems.

2. In reply to the question whether work was done on Colonial Office, Dominions or India Office systems, Dr.Paschke replied that it was difficult to keep them apart. All unrecyphered codes were investigated. India Office traffic was only investigated when enough personnel was available, which was not often, and in any case there was little material.

3. British unrecyphered 4-letter books. The time lag between the introduction of a new book and the reading of messages naturally varied very much, but in favourable circumstances was about 3 months. Much of course depended on a good link-up with published statements in the press. They had a subsection for reading newspapers for this purpose but information from the press could not be used until the book was already built up to some extent and was then only called for when a partially decoded message was found to be based on such material. The value system on which the books were constructed gave no assistance in their reconstruction.

4. British unrecyphered 5-letter books. The time lag in book-building was longer than with the 4-letter books, i.e. 4 to 5 months, but the content of the messages was less important. There were two large books, one in general use, the other principally used for the traffic of the South Africa Government. The first was also used by Eire. These books were of no great importance and were not fully built up.

5. One 4-letter and one 5-letter book were captured in Norway but both were already readable.

6. No recyphered letter traffic was read.

British figure systems. They had no captured books, but an out of date recyphering table was captured in Norway, which enabled Dr.Kunze to strip the traffic for a time. Analysis of the captured table gave an idea of the scope and method of recyphering, but they never actually read any of the traffic. The starting points for the subtractor depended on the date and the number of the message.

No work was done on figure traffic sent with a 5-letter indicator of the type CVCVC or VCVCV. It contained groups of unrecyphered code in the preamble. No intelligence about order of battle of military authorities etc. was extracted from these preambles in the Auswärtiges Amt, as the O.K.W. had copies of the messages in any case. No assistance in breaking additive recypherments was received from references to previous telegrams made in plain code in the preambles of cypher telegrams.

A "five" figure system, Interdepartmental Cypher, was captured in Norway, but the O.K.W. and Görings Forschungsamt were principally concerned with its exploitation. He thought that the degarbling system had been reconstructed.

Dr. Paschke made it clear that although these systems were not read, there was in fact enough material for them to be readable. When asked whether any assistance was offered the organization in this respect he said that they had to manage with the personnel they had. The acquisition of Hollerith machinery had no connexion with the previous failure to solve British systems. Periodical checks were made to see whether the systems changed but they were convinced that no fundamental change occurred.

No work was done on British commercial or Bank of England systems. Dr. Paschke was of the opinion that these were not handled by the O.K.W. either but suggested that Göring's Forschungsamt might have been concerned, as it had economic and industrial interests.

It was made clear at this point that there were three independent parties working on diplomatic systems in Germany - the O.K.W., the Auswärtiges Amt, and Göring's Forschungsamt. The Auswärtiges Amt had less liaison with the Forschungsamt than with the O.K.W.

Shift Working: Working hours were from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m., though Dr. Kunze's party occasionally worked nights. There was always a duty officer available at night. They had no regular shift system because it was difficult to get people who were suitable to be heads of watches.

Interception: Material came from 3 main sources:

1. O.K.W. which maintained interception stations at Lauf, Treuenbrietzen and Lörrach. Traffic received by T/P.

2. Forschungsamt, stations not known. Material intercepted by the Post Office, both W/T and L/T, reached 'Pers. ZS' through the Forschungsamt until that was bombed out, after which this type of material came direct from the Central Post Office.

3. 'Pers. ZS' maintained a small interception station of its own in Dahlem, called Landhaus. It was used to cover the more important traffics such as Ankara and Lisbon. London was always very poorly received.

The O.K.W. maintained interception stations in occupied countries; he knew of one in the Balkans, one in Greece and one in France. Material was received from diplomatic posts abroad and none from foreign interception services, except some traffic intercepted by the Hungarians which was forwarded through the O.K.W. Nothing was ever received from the Italians or the Finns. In most cases the traffic was copied in the O.K.W. or the Forschungsamt before it reached 'Pers. ZS', so there was no indication of its origin.

It was stated that the O.K.W. did not work on British recyphered books.

It when a low system was broken it was discovered that traffic dealt mainly with matters outside the diplomatic field, it was handed over to O.K.W. for exploitation.

Dr. Paschke was unable to say which British channels produced the greatest number of messages with intelligence value and said that Frl. Hagen could answer this question precisely. [Comment: this lady is ill and is at present detained at Harburg].

On the matter of misuse of low grade systems for the purpose of passing high grade information, Dr. Paschke stated that though in general the intelligence value of the low grade traffics was not high they had carried a number of messages of considerable interest. His impression had been at the time that these messages were passed in that way for the express benefit of the Germans. He recalled a number of messages before the out-break of the war to the effect that Britain would not remain neutral in the event of a conflict between Germany and Poland. He remembered a case about six months ago of a short telegram from London to Berne concerning the burning of a signature to the Atlantic Charter. This message aroused considerable interest in Berlin and the cryptographers were asked to check its accuracy, as its meaning was not clear. There was no cryptographic uncertainty about the decypherment, but the text remained obscure and its meaning was never cleared up. Some such messages were shown to the Führer, principally those concerning the treatment of prisoners of war.

No messages relied "ENIGMA" was used.

(1) American traffic: Most important was the American Chiefs of Staff traffic, particularly the cryptographic systems, as this material was easier to read. The links to the U.S. Embassy, London via Berlin were the most important, particularly [illegible]. The Berlin-Washington material was also read from time to time.

(2) [illegible] cipher [illegible] called [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] this model and improved it. [illegible] was [illegible] and known [illegible] their messages [illegible]. The Swiss [illegible] [illegible]. He had investigated the Kryha machine and knew exactly what it was soluble. He had also come in [illegible] of 'Schlüsselscheiben', one of the principal [illegible] which he described as consisting [illegible] wiring. It was not very [illegible] the O.K.W. [illegible] confused with Hitt[illegible]'s Lorenz [illegible] finding cryptographic faults in it. The Amt used the 'Schlüsselscheiben' but the O.K.W. was responsible for [illegible] where the machines came from. Which Dept. [illegible] be said that they were supplied in order that their security could be tested. [illegible] machines had been investigated by the Wehrmacht and O.K.W. had read material encyphered with them. [illegible] was to ensure that cryptographic possibilities were known and appreciated. He had met with [illegible], Head of the Cypher Security Section of the Luftwaffe Amt, on this subject and was satisfied with the liaison existing with the Luftwaffe responsible for German systems. At this point, Dr. Fassbender observed that they had reason to be convinced of the superiority of German systems ('Wir waren ja durch Jahre hindurch von der Überlegenheit der deutschen Verfahren'), for which OKH. Schlüsselgeräte 41 (Sturmmörser) [illegible] this remark [illegible] to include the Enigma machine. In reply to the question whether the [illegible] were that the [illegible] had come to an end, ORR. Schaufler said that although the age had begun with the first world war and was likely to end with the second. It was however worth bearing in mind that at the end of the last war people were saying that the age of cryptography was over. He felt that the history of cryptography, in which he had a lifelong interest, had in this connexion a real function to perform, in that it [illegible] proved [illegible] methods of solution [illegible] purpose of the possibilities. Machines for [illegible] were only [illegible] as they were well known. The Swiss Enigma [illegible] was [illegible]. The Reichsbahn had [illegible] the use of the Enigma machine [illegible] for [illegible] purposes. The Post Office [illegible]. Dr. Fassbender [illegible] the Russian [illegible] the Polish [illegible] army had developed [illegible] for use [illegible] which was [illegible]. The O.K.H. [illegible] Enigma [illegible]. [illegible] solution was [illegible] always [illegible] known. [illegible] [illegible].

7. Special characteristics of Russian cryptanalysis. Large differences between account figures were comparatively rare. He had seen a solution of Russian one time pads captured in the field. They had been typed on a typewriter with one carbon. Series of figures (e.g. 2-1-76 etc.) with a difference of 1 for common and other personal and peculiarities of the typist, such as a poor misstroke (e.g. 'Angst vor der Null'). The interceptors were confronted with the first group of the finished telegram. The false sum of a pencil mark group was the discriminant.

8. Mentioning the circumstances which led Russian type one changed after the publication of the British White Paper in 1927, ORR. Schmidler remarked that we did not publish the really intersting material at the time and he had never been able to understand why not.

9. Double transposition. When asked about their control success with systems of this kind, Dr. Rosen thought that it was at times possible to read them currently, but that it depended on a matter of luck. It would be thought, and ORR. Schmidler agreed, that they caused as much trouble to the Russians as they did to the cryptographers; they were known to exist, but no work had been done on them.

10. Last War Papers: ORR. Schmidler observed that his notes on the decrypted material ('Serie 20') contained a collection of material relating to the cryptographic work done by the Germans on British Naval cyphers during the last war.

11. Strength of the Organisation prior to Invasion: Rough figures were given as follows:

1918	20 to 30 people
1930	50 people
1939	80 - 100 people
1945	150 - 200 people

12. Location of Records. After the [illegible] Russian Naval Attaché [illegible] London, Capt. ORR. Schmidler, the 'Serie 20' [illegible], Polish and Slovak documents, the [illegible] in charge of [illegible]. It was also said to have come to [illegible]. Dr. Rosen, [illegible]. [illegible] to promise anything on either of these points.

DISTRIBUTION

[illegible]

Y/F 15(Q)

TOP SECRET

DB/1219

D.D.(C.S.A.)

With reference to my DB/1206 of 26th May, 1943, herewith a copy of the minutes of the fourth and fifth meetings with the Auswaertiges Amt cryptographers. There is little of direct interest to us - page 3, Typex machine captured at Dunkirk; page 4, distinction between systems insoluble in practice and in principle; page 5, Austrian cryptographers paid on a 'piece rate'; page 5, American diplomatic systems.

The minutes of the sixth and seventh meetings, at which I was present, will be available shortly.

29th May, 1943.

Meetings with German Cryptographers held at the Oratory School on 19th May, 1945.

Fourth Meeting at 11 a.m.

Present: Prof. Vincent, Major Seaman U.S.A., Lt. Fehl U.S.A., Dr. Forster.
Later: Dr. Kunze, Professor Rohrbach, Herren Rave, Hierer and Grosse.

Dr. Kunze and Professor Rohrbach were called.

When examining the captured material it was found that the most recent work reports were missing. The gentlemen were asked what the explanation of this was. They replied that all the documents of the research section had been destroyed at Zschepplin.

Dr. Kunze was then asked about the machine, mentioned at a previous meeting, for solving the American strip. This machine was for decoding, not for analysing. Double-length strips were hung on lugs attached to rollers. The cypher text was typed on a machine which unrolled the strips so that the cypher text was visible along the bottom of the window. The clear text was then visible on some line higher up in the window. An electric device had been designed to illuminate the frequent clear text letters. This was abandoned, as it was found more convenient to print the common letters in heavy type on the strips and read off the lines containing the greatest number of letters in heavy type. The strips were made 52 letters long and were arranged in a bank of 15. The machine was thought to be with some Hollerith machinery in two waggons which had never arrived at Zschepplin [Comment: see report on Second Meeting].

With respect to the Hagelin Machine found among the captured material, Dr. Kunze said it was thought that Roumania, Sweden and Finland used this machine. No traffic had ever been solved for lack of time and personnel. He had heard it said that the Hagelin was also used by the French and American armies. The specimen mentioned had been acquired by the organisation for general investigation of its properties and had never been used to decode anything. [Comment: the number on the cyclometer of the machine is only 295].

Dr. Kunze was then asked about the Japanese machine traffic discussed at a previous meeting and whether a machine had been constructed to decode it. He replied no, that they had been able to achieve the desired result with paper models.

Major Seaman then asked about the purpose of a number of rotary switches found among the captured material. Dr. Kunze said that he was not quite sure what switches were meant but he thought that they were captured material ('Beutematerial') sent to them 'in case they came in useful', as electrical fittings of this kind were in short supply.

Scandinavian systems were next discussed. No material had been read. Swedish traffic, thought a priori to be Hagelin, was investigated for three months in 1941. At first the machine had 25 letters, then after two months a machine with 26 letters was introduced. In August 1944 another investigation was begun, in which Professor Rohrbach participated, to determine whether the indicators fitted the Hagelin pattern.

Asked about Turkish systems, on which there was a noticeable lack of material among the captured documents, Dr. Kunze stated that all the Turkish material had been burnt.

Dr. Kunze was then dismissed and Messrs. Rave, Hierer and Grosse were called. Professor Rohrbach in the meantime explained that these gentlemen were of a definitely lower grade and had come to 'Pers ZS' to be trained. He spoke of them with obvious distaste.

.....

Messrs. Rave, Hierer and Grosse were all employed by the O.K.W. and loaned to 'Pers ZS' in December 1943 to assist with Chinese and Japanese traffic.

Rave had joined the O.K.W. in October 1941. He was first at Tirpitzufer 72 - 76 until it was bombed out, then at Im Dol, Dahlem. He had got his friend Hierer into the O.K.W. because of his knowledge of Chinese. Grosse had been employed on Italian at the O.K.W. and was later transferred to Chinese. It did not appear that he had any knowledge of the latter language.

Rave, the spokesman of the group, gave a sketch of the Organization of O.K.W. Chi. The head was Oberst Kempf, who was relieved in 1943 by Oberst Kettler. The sections were: translating and bookbreaking, under Ministerialrat Fenner; Interception; Intelligence, under Oberst Kalkstein; cryptographic research, under Hüttenhain; and 'Z', the department dealing with administration and personnel.

Rave and the others had worked in Fenner's section under Oberleutnant Adler. This group consisted of 12 - 15 people, engaged at first on Japanese only, then Chinese.

When asked what they had heard of notable successes of O.K.W. Chi, they said that they had heard vaguely of successes on American and British systems and mentioned Russian military attaché reports read [illegible] when Rommel was in North Africa. They thought it had been broken by cryptography, not owing to physical capture. [illegible] It was plain that these statements were based on rumour only.

They admitted that most of the work done in 'Pers. ZS' was duplicated in the O.K.W., which worked on diplomatic systems only. Service systems were dealt with by the respective services concerned, O.K.W., C.H.W. etc. Liaison between O.K.W. and 'Pers. ZS' was carried on by Fenner and Rasche. Comment: Kunze and Rasche had been military cryptographers in World War I. who were concerned at the amount of duplication and wanted to avoid it.

Their efforts were not regarded with favour by Selchow. There had been some co-operation early in 1943 on Turkish, but apart from that the loan of Rave, Hierer and Grosse to 'Pers.ZS' had been the only occasion they knew of on which the two departments had worked together. The situation was not improved by the O.K.W.'s practice of calling up competent people from other departments, putting them in the ranks and then drafting them into its own cryptographic organization. The O.K.W. had neither the long tradition nor the expertise which 'Pers.ZS' possessed, though Ministerialrat Fenner and a small party had been engaged on this work in peace-time. [Comment: it is possible that this was said in deference to Professor Rohrbach who was present throughout this interview.]

In the matter of captured material and machines, Rave said that new arrivals at O.K.W. Chi had been shown a British machine captured at Dunkirk. It was broken and rusty and did not work.

Chinese and Japanese systems: They had read a Chinese Military Attaché system, which had ceased in April or May 1943. The first groups of the traffic were EFR, SKW or JKW. The recypherment consisted of transposition within the code groups. The groups were 3 letter groups. They solved the recypherment but never read any messages.

Another Chinese traffic, with discriminant NKDBN, was investigated. It also consisted of 3 letter groups but was unrecyphered. It contained many spells which were easily recognisable, the names etc. being spelt out in simple substitution. It was a purely military code.

They broke a Japanese 'Kennwort - Code' consisting of double transposition of 2 and 4 letter groups from a known book; the transposition was done by a stencil, the stencil being the same for bothing transposing operations. The system was broken on a re-encypherment. It was a diplomatic system used between Moscow and Tokio. They read it from the middle of 1942 to June or July 1943.

No work was done on Japanese attaché systems. Rave remembered the Japanese Naval Attaché visiting Oberst Kettler.

Grosse, asked about Italian work in the O.K.W., mentioned a diplomatic system AR 22 and the Impero code as having been solved. His statement in general tallied with that of Dr. Paschke at a previous meeting on Italian work in 'Pers.ZS'. The Italian section in the O.K.W. consisted of 15 to 17 people.

Professor Rohrbach pointed out, after these gentlemen had been dismissed, that their statement on the Japanese 'Kennwort - Code' had been inaccurate. The recypherment was single transposition, not double.

Fifth Meeting on [illegible]

Present: Prof. Vincent, Major Seaman U.S.A., Lt. Pond U.S.A., Dr. Forster.
Later: In succession: Dr. Karstien, Mr. Zastrow, Prof. Rohrbach

Dr. Karstien and Professor Rohrbach were called together. Dr. Karstien however objected to the presence of Rohrbach and it was agreed to interview him alone. [Comment: Rohrbach informed

the meeting later that there was considerable antagonism between himself and Karstien.]

Dr. Karstien had been employed on Slavonic systems until 1930 when he changed to Chinese. In 1938 after the Anschluss the Slavonic countries became more important and he went back to them.

The Yugoslavs used a five figure code with letter bigram tables consisting of 100 bigrams. This system was read from 1938 to 1943, when traffic dropped, after which it was read with interruptions. They had not received any Tito traffic, nor military attaché.

Arising out of the matter of attaché systems he gave a short summary of the division of work between the O.K.W. and 'Pers.ZS'. The O.K.W. had at first been responsible for service systems only but had not had enough readable material to train its personnel. It had then taken up diplomatic systems and having once tasted blood it refused to leave them. 'Pers Z S' left all attaché systems to the O.K.W. [Comment: Dr. Karstien was clearly at some pains to bring out the interdepartmental rivalry at which other members of the organization had only hinted.]

He mentioned a 10,000 group Chinese Code worked on by Dr. Olbricht, who he thought was lucky, as in the days when he himself worked on the Chinese he had to cope with a code book of 40,000 groups.

Asked about the application of the experience of the organization to the security of German systems, he said that at an early stage the Germans had progressed so far on a scientific basis that they had little to learn (... 'sind schon früh auf wissenschaftlichem Gebiet sehr weit gekommen, sodass wohl keine Belehrung nötig gewesen'). He mentioned O.R.R. Langlotz (who died two years ago) and O.R.R.Schauffler as having materially contributed to this desirable result. [Comment: see minutes of the Sixth meeting.]

He discounted any assistance received from captured material. He had had occasion to examine captured Czech material and stated that the Czech systems were unbreakable. In reply to the question 'in what respect were they unbreakable?' he stated that the Czechs used one-time pads. There was, he explained, a difference between systems which were insoluble in practice (owing to lack of time, personnel or equipment) and those insoluble in principle, such as the Czech, Russian and German systems. [Comment: This valuable distinction was much appreciated by the interrogators.]

Polish systems he had found unbreakable in practice; there were too many of them. They required more labour than the department had at its disposal. He mentioned a five figure book with a subtractor.

The Bulgarians used Five Figure codes of 40,000 groups with frequent repagination.

The Lit.[illegible] Letts used mainly transposition, sometimes double, sometimes simple, occasionally combined with Vigenère substitution.

He had never been concerned with the solution of machine systems.

No liaison with foreign cryptographers existed.

No intelligence work was done in the department itself on decyphered material, though the selection of material for issue was of course guided by considerations of its possible intelligence value. This selection was done by the Referent [sub-section head] on the basis of knowledge and experience.

In the matter of official recognition of work done by the organization he observed that there was none, even from the Minister though, as everywhere, the authorities were quick enough when it came to complaining. [Comment: this question was inspired by the discovery in Dr. Paschke's private papers of a letter dated 30.5.1938 from the Foreign Minister, von Weizsäcker, congratulating Paschke on particularly successful efforts ('besonders erfolgreiche Bemühungen') in the field of work assigned to him.] 'We worked', said Dr. Karstien with some complacency, 'entirely in the dark' ['Wir arbeiteten vollständig im Dunkeln'. Comment: the romantic aspect of this kind of activity appeared to afford him some satisfaction.] It had been different with the Austrian Foreign Office cryptographers, who had been paid partly by results; solution of a difficult problem had been rewarded by a bonus. A former member of the Austrian organization (now dead) had transferred to 'Pers.ZS' after the Anschluss and professed himself dissatisfied with the remuneration in his new employment.

Dr. Karstien was dismissed and RR. Zastrow called.

.....

RR Zastrow asked that Professor Rohrbach be allowed to be present at the interview. He was accordingly called.

RR Zastrow is a bookbreaker and has been engaged on [illegible] systems for 27 years. The Americans used mainly 5 letter books with 10 recyphering tables for monoalphabetic and bigram substitution to each book. The tables ran for two to six months. Later other substitution tables began to be used, with 5 indicator groups to each table. The tables were changed in the course of a message, the indicator for the new table being encyphered with the previous table.

The German designation for these systems was B1, B2, B3 etc., to B9, (B = Buchstabe). American equivalents he remembered were:

B6a = A1
B6b = B1
B7 = C1
B8 = Brown Book

The B6a book was known through physical compromise. The 'Brown Book' had been captured but it was very little used. [illegible]

A transposition system used by the 'Coordinator of Information Washington' was mentioned. No success had been achieved with this.

At one point RR. Zastrow had been lent to the O.K.W. The head of the British and American subsection in the O.K.W. was ORR. Rohen, who did the same work as was done in 'Pers.ZS' but had more people to do it.

RR. Zastrow knew of no U.S. machines or cyphers other than the strip.

He said that he was tired of cryptography after 27 years and would like to change over to some kind of administrative post in the diplomatic service. [Comment: the interrogators did not think he would do well in such a post.]

Professor Rohrbach was careful to point out that the loan of Zastrow to the O.K.W. by 'Pers.ZS' was a very different matter from the loan of Rave, Hierer and Grosse to 'Pers.ZS' by the O.K.W. Zastrow was an expert and a man of considerable experience, whereas the other three were young men who had to be taught their business. [See report of Fourth Meeting.]

[Comment: Conversation was carried on in English. RR. Zastrow's speech consisted largely of indistinct mumblings, so that some difficulty was experienced in recording what he said. Prof. Rohrbach informed the interrogators that Zastrow was very difficult to understand even when speaking German.]

The meeting was adjourned.

Distribution.

Brigadier Tiltman.
Professor Vincent.
Major Seaman U.S.A.(2)
Cdr. Denniston-Smith R.N.
Lt. Fehl U.S.A.(2)
Lt. Eschman U.S.N. (2)
Cdr. Lecor R.N.V.R. for Hinsley (2)
Dr. Forster.

15 (Q)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Herewith copies of the "minutes" of the first three meetings with the civilian (German cryptographic staff of "Lorenz [redacted]", the Nachrichten cryptographic bureau of the German Foreign Office.

I spent all day on Monday, 21st May, interviewing several of them, and the minutes will be available shortly. The main point which emerged was that no real success was achieved with cribbing [redacted] long sub-texts, although traffic of a little in force from January 1940 to January 1941 was lined up to a depth of 15 over a key length of about 2000 groups, and the sub-texts literally recovered. Sufficient hand breaking was not achieved however to produce intelligence.

It is not clear whether cycles H or K was the one broken, but we are now in the process of examining some of their captured documents which may throw further light on the problem. Possible processing tables are [redacted] 2 (in force 1.11.40 - 6.1.41; 3) autumn, dr. 3 (Autumn 1940 - 31.1.41) or one of the K tables (between [redacted] M. 11) of which I have no records.

When a new D Code was introduced it took about [redacted] to build it sufficiently to produce reasonably complete [redacted].

[redacted]

[redacted]

MEETINGS HELD WITH GERMAN CRYPTOGRAPHERS FROM BURGSCHEIDUNGEN AND ASCHAFFLIU

ON 9th MAY 1945 AT THE ORATORY SCHOOL AND 12th MAY 1945

AT 101 NIGHTINGALE LANE WANDSWORTH

First meeting (at 11.30)

Present: Brigadier Tiltman, Professor Vincent
Col Cook U.S.A., Lt. Fehl U.S.A., Dr. Forster
and later: Professor Dr. Rohrbach.

It was agreed before the meeting
a. to treat general matters only
b. to interview Professor Rohrbach alone first.

Professor Rohrbach was then called and asked to sketch the organisation to which he belonged. It was made clear to him that the meeting had neither the desire nor power to intimidate him or his colleagues into imparting information against their will. He replied that he and his colleagues were prepared to talk on a professional basis of "exchange of results" though it was clear to them that the exchange would necessarily be onesided.

He gave the official designation of his organisation as Department 'Pers Z S' of the Auswärtiges Amt. It had formerly been known as the 'Chiffrierabteilung' but later the cover 'Pers Z S' was adopted. The organisation was concerned with cryptography on foreign diplomatic codes and cyphers; no military or other material was handled. There was another department of the Auswärtiges Amt which dealt with the production and security of German diplomatic systems, but any liason between it and 'Pers Z S' was purely informal. This department had remained in Berlin until the end.

The head of the orgainsation was Gesandter SELCHOW. The three sections of which it consisted were under

Oberregierungsrat SCHAUFFLER
" Dr. PASCHKE
" Dr. KUNZE

Dr. Kunze was an old hand and had been in the organisation for 27 years. He was responsible for the initial breaking of difficult systems, recypherments etc. His staff consisted largely of mathematicians. Hollerith machines had not been available to him until 1942 but by the end he had about 20 machines. This was thought to be due to the personal interest of Ribbentrop.

Dr. Paschke was responsible for bookbuilders and translators. His section was organised by countries and languages. He also carried out such liason as was done with the Wehrmacht.

ORR Schauffler: a mathematician. Started life as a schoolmaster, was gassed in the last war and on return to his job found schoolmastering too much for him. Entered this organisation shortly afterwards as a mathematician. Then became interested in Far Eastern languages, in which he specialised. This field was theoretical research ('Grundlagenforschung') on cryptography, and he edited a private periodical which circulated within the office, called 'Schriften des Auswärtigen Amts'. It was concerned largely with cryptographic methodology. (Comment: Copies found among the documents contained solutions of problems connected with the enigma machine. With this in mind the question of the distribution of the periodical was raised.) It had no distribution outside the office and was only held by senior staff inside; a copy went to Selchow, but as he did not understand much about cryptography it was thought improbable that he read it. There was very little liason with other cryptographic bureaux; nothing was known about relations with foreign cryptographers.

Professor Rohrbach was at pains to explain his own position. He had a chair of mathematics at Prauge, which he held concurrently with his appointment with the Foreign Office, travelling often back and forth. He had chanced to be at Burgscheidungen when the place was overrun. The senior members of the organisation had panicked in the absence of Selchow, and he was the only person who had the presence of mind to take any common sense action. He had thus become the leader of the party. He was careful to point out that this was not due to any position he held within the organisation or to any superior competence he might have as a cryptographer, but purely to force of character. In discussion of questions of cryptographic detail he wished to be regarded merely as a member of Dr. Kunze's section.

The gentlemen appeared to be a comfortable as was consistent with the circumstances, but were concerned about one of their number, Dr. GALINSKY, who was suspected of having acute tuberculosis. This had been discovered the day before they left Germany. It was arranged that he should have a medical examination.

SECOND MEETING (at 3 o'clock)

Present: The foregoing and Dr. Kunze, Dr. Paschke and [illegible] Schauffler.

The basis on which the meetings were to be conducted was explained to the new arrivals. The principle of 'One-sided exchange' was agreed to. (Comment: The interrogators felt much obliged to Lt. Col. Evans who appears to have been originally responsible for this highly diplomatic formula.)

Dr. Kunze was asked to sketch what in his opinion the principle successes of the organisation had been.

He stated that he himself had been employed on similar work by the High Command in the last war and mentioned success with British naval cypher at that time.

In 1924 he had broken a French system of bigram substitution using 100-figure bigram tables on a 4-figure book.

Russian systems had been read at that time but, as Dr. Paschke observed, after the appearance of the British White Paper in 1927 the Russians changed their systems and discouraged circular telegrams; there was then not enough depth.

Polish systems consisting of subtractor tables on a 4-figure book were mentioned as having been solved at about that time.

In 1929 or 1930 they began to read Jugoslav traffic employing bigrammatic substitution on a 5-figure book. At first the recypherment was applied horizontally, later vertically. Manchurian systems were mentioned, but conversation branched off to the subject of Japanese. At this point OFR. Schauffler also took part in the conversation.

Until 1934 lower grade Japanese systems were read currently. After 1934 the Japanese went over increasingly to the use of a machine. The moral effect of the machine on the party had been considerable and it was some time before they discovered that it could theoretically be broken. They did not in fact read any traffic until September 1938. They then read the machine currently until February 1939 when it became unreadable owing to difficulties with wheel turn-over (Comment: The use of a different machine does not seem to have been considered). In the meantime they read all the back traffic as far back as 1936. They continued to read the lower grade material currently until the end.

ORR. Schauffler had worked on Chinese systems for 20 years, part of the time in conjunction with the celebrated liguist Legationsrat Krebs, whose pupil he considered himself to be. They read 4-figure and 4 letter traffic until 1930. At the beginning of the war Chinese was taken up again in conjunction with the O.K.W. which supplid personnel. It was agreed to discuss Far Eastern traffic in detail at some later meeting.

They handled no attaché traffic, either Japanese or any other. Dr. Steinberg of the O.K.W. was said to have worked on Japanese military attaché traffic.

In 1939 Kunze was approached by the Luftwaffe for assistance with British weather cyphers. He was successful with these.

In May 1938 they began to break a British diplomatic system. In 1940 to 41 the tables ran for three months, so that there was considerable depth (Comment: Uncertain whether these two sentences refer to the same system). They found however that the labour involved was such that it

was too much trouble to read the material currently without machines. On the introduction of 'special' keys the investigation was discontinued. A written report was available on this subject (Comment: The circumstances that this investigation was broken off in 1941 and that Hollerith machinery became available in 1942 may be connected, though this point was not raised at the time. They appear at all events to have had no further success with British systems. It was thought best not to press this point for the time being but to discuss it in detail at a later meeting).

In 1943 the American strip system No. 2 was solved, but with considerable time lag. It involved a great deal of time and effort. A machine was designed to eliminate this, and Dr. Kunze though that it must be with the machinery sent from Hermsdorf in three waggons, only one of which had arrived at Zschepplin. He thought that most of the workings on this system had been destroyed at Zschepplin.

Dr. Paschke was asked what success he had had with the Italian systems. He replied that he had been instructed in 1935 to devote special attention to Italian and that the results had been the best imaginable; they had read everything ('Den schönsten Erfolg, den man sich denken kann; es wurde alles gelesen'). In 1942/43 work became increasingly difficult: the Italians increased their subtractor material before the collapse and employed bigram substitution over a subtractor over a book. If they had changed the book, the traffic would have become 'impossible' to read. After the collapse they read a Government code 'Impero' recyphered with figures from the encode, with little depth. Later the Government systems were not read for lack of depth, but it was thought that they used double transposition. The Neofascists had used a 5,000 figure subtractor; the peculiar systematic arrangement of the figures in the subtractor assisted solution very much. In the last three months the Neofascists had used unrecyphered books which were easily read, and an alphabetical book with a short subtractor called RA 1.

When asked what assistance they had had from captured material he said that it was unwelcome and seldom useful. They had never had any liason with foreign (e.g. Finnish, Hungerian or Japanese) cryptographic organisations and had never been visited by foreign cryptographers.

Note: All four gentlemen seemed to be fully co-operative, including Dr. Paschke, contrary to reports from the field. They were concerned about their security, as they had no privacy and would in the long run find it difficult to keep the nature of their work secret from their fellow internees. It was suggested that they might be prepared to write reports on their activity, to which all replied that they would be prepared to do so but their present circumstances were unsuited to 'Scientific work'.

The meeting was adjourned.

THIRD MEETING

Held at 101 Nightingale Lane Wandsworth on 12.[illegible] at 11.15

Present: Professor Vincent, Col. Cook U.S.A., Lt. [illegible] U.S.N.
Dr. Forster, Frl. Friedrichs
and later: Frl. Dr. Jennwitz, Frau Dr. Mahnke, Frl. [illegible]

It was decided before the meeting
a. to discuss general matters only
b. to see Frl. Friedrichs alone first.

The basis on which the meetings were to be conducted was explained to Frl. Friedrichs, who agreed. The conversation was conducted in English.

Frl. Friedrichs stated that her duty was decypherment of Bulgarian and other Slavonic cyphers. She had, however, from time to time been loaned to other sections. For instance she had been loaned for a time to Dr. Kunze at the time when the American strip system Number 2 was being broken. She had maintained a personal interest in the American strip system and had clearly enjoyed the work very much. She mentioned Dr. Zastrow as an authority on U.S. systems. Her approach to the work as a whole was a professional one, the work gave her pleasure and she felt a proprietary interest in it. She touched on the position of women in the organisation. She said it had been a long fight to obtain for women the same pay as men, but that that had finally been achieved, however, though they received the same pay they had not the same status. At the beginning of the war a great many women had been engaged somewhat to the chagrin of men who had not been used to working with large numbers of women. She instanced the case of one woman who had reached a senior position in the organisation, Frl. Hagen, for whom she evidently had a great admiration, and whom she characterised as an extremely able cryptographer. Her duty was primarily British cypher systems and the systems of the Spanish and Portuguese countries. At the time of their departure from Germany Frl. Hagen was in hospital with a skin complaint. When asked whether she knew of any connection that the organisation had with similar organisations outside, she answered in the negative. Such liason as was done was carried out by Dr. Paschke. She gave the impression that, far from there having been any co-ordination between the various cryptographic organisations, there was a considerable feeling of rivalry. The general impression that she gave of her organisation was that it was a small, self-contained show, functioning entirely by itself, that it was starved of personnel and equipment and that little interest was taken in it higher up *. The Head of the organisation, was a competent administrator who understood little about cryptography, and was content to leave the specialists to run their affairs as it seemed best to them. When asked whether there had ever been any evidence of appreciation of the work done in the organisation, she replied that there had been none. From time to time, copies of the telegrams they issued had been returned to them bearing a stamp indicating that they had been seen by the Führer, otherwise no indication of the importance attached to this work had penetrated to the level at which she worked. No intelligence was extracted from the material by them, except such as was necessary in order to enable them to continue reading the traffic. There was no sense of urgency in the office, decyphered messages were not transmitted by teleprinter by their recipients. In the matter of translation of decyphered texts, the organisation had established rigid rules and in general favoured a literal translation in contradistinction to the practice of the OKW, which was always concerned to round off and polish up the translation and make it flow, usually leaving out corrupt groups or obscure passages. There was little encouragement given to communication of results inside the organisation by junior members, who were encouraged to mind their own business. In general such exchange of results as was carried out was done on a purely informal basis between friends.

* Total personnel thought to be about 120, of whom 10 worked in the Slavonic section.

Mrl. Friedrichs was concerned about the possible fate of the men. She herself had been about the world a fair amount and would find it easy to obtain different employment after the war. Most of the men were already in late middle age; they had done nothing by cryptography all their lives and had no other interests and she did not see how they were going to support themselves without it. (comment: No statement was made by the interrogators in response to this hint regarding the eventual disposal of the members of this organisation).

It was felt that little more of a general nature could be elicited, so that it was decided to call in the remaining ladies. A short discussion on personal matters was held with them. They were concerned about the fate of their men-folk and wished information to be given to their relations in Germany that they were safe and sound if this were possible. It was pointed out that the members of the meeting had no power to do this but were prepared to transmit such requests; they could, however, give no guarantee that anything would be done. None of the ladies appeared any the worse for their two days' sojurn in Holloway Prison.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

a. Japan, China
b. Mittel
c. Iran, Afghanistan
d. Italien, Griechenland
e. Frankreich, Belgien, Schweiz
f. Benelux
g. Jugoslawien
h. USA
i. England, Irland, Spanien, Portugal, Latein-Amerika

3. Information und Nachrichtenkartei

+) Ab Januar und März 1945 wurden weitere Verlagerungen der Abteilungen notwendig, durch die bis zum Eintreffen der Besatzungstruppen keine endgültigen Gruppierungen mehr zustande gekommen sind (siehe Skizze).

II Ausweichstelle H i r s c h b e r g (Riesengebirge)

Leiter: Regierungsrat Dr. K a r s t i e n

a) Kryptographische Aufgaben:

1. Entwicklung neuer Codes
2. Bearbeitung, Übersetzung und Auswertung von Telegrammen wichtiger Eilfälle usw.
3. [illegible]

b) Übrige Gebiete:

a. Balkan, Türkei, Iran
b. Japan, China
c. Frankreich, Belgien, Schweiz

III Arbeitsgruppe Kornsdorf (Bezirksarzt)

Leiter: Oberregierungsrat Dr. K u n z e

Die Behebung schwieriger hygienischer Probleme:
Diagnose und Lösung neuauftretender Schädlingsverfahren;
insbesondere solcher, die einen größeren Personal- und
Zeit- aufwand oder auch die Verwendung technischer
Geräte erfordern.

Ein charakteristisches Beispiel für die Zusammenarbeit der
obengenannten drei Dienststellen stellt das Arbeitsgebiet dar:
Einsatz z. B. in einem bestimmten japanischen Verfahren die
Entlausung der Überschlusselung in Kornsdorf' (Dr. Schreiber)
erfolgte die laufende Lösung der weiteren Schädlinge in Wirschberg
(Dr. Eberlein) und wurde schließlich der ausgedehnte [illegible] in Heilen
entwickelt, wo auch die Übersetzung und Herausgabe der betreffenden
Belege und Vorgänge [illegible] wurde (Dr. Schauffler).

B. ORGANISATION OF 'PERS Z S' AS IN APRIL 1945

'Pers Z S' (Sondedienst des Referats Z in der Personalabteilung des Auswärtigen Amts)

Aufgabe: Entzifferung chiffrierter diplomatischer Telegramme fremder Regierungen.

Leiter: Gesandter I Kl. Selchow

Gliederung: (Stand vom April 1945)

I. Systematik, Grundlagenforschung, Wissenschaftliches Archiv, Berichtwesen Referent: ORR Schauffler

II. Sprachlich-kryptologische Abteilung Leiter: ORR Paschke

A. Länder-Referate:

1. Frankreich, Belgien, Schweis, Holland
   Referent: RR Brandes
   Vertreter: WHA Frl. Schrader

2. Britisches Imperium, Irland, Spanien, Portugal, Mittel-und Süd-amerikanische Staaten, Thailand
   Referent: WHA Frl. Hagen
   Vertreter: WHA Frl. Wernick

3. Italien, Vatikan, Griechenland, UdSSR
   Referent: ORR Paschke
   Vertreter: WHA Dr. Deubner

4. Rumänien
   Referent: RR Dr. Kasper
   Vertreter: WHA Menning

5. Slawische Staaten (ausser UdSSR), Lettland, Litauen
   Referent: RR Dr. Karstien
   Vertreter: WHA Frl. Friedrich

6. USA, Skandinavische Staaten
   Referent: WHA Dr. Mueller, Hans-Kurt
   Vertreter: WHA Zastrow

7. Türkei — Referent: ORR Scherschmidt; Vertreter: WHA Burghard

8. Iran, Afghanistan, Arabische Staaten — Referent: RR Dr. Benzing; Vertreter: Frl. Dr. Schimmel

9. Japan, China, Mandschukuo — Referent: ORR Schauffler; Vertreter: Dr. Olbricht

B. Büro, Information (Auskunfsstelle für die Länderreferate) und Archiv der herausgegebeneb Telegramme — Referent: Prof. Dr. Horn

III. Mathematisch-kryptologische Abteilung — Leiter: ORR Dr. Kunze

Dem 30. April 1945.

Distribution.

Brigadier Tiltman
Professor Vincent
Major Seaman, U.S.A.
Lt. Fehl, U.S.A. (3)
Ticom (Capt. Cowan)
Dr. Forster.

15 (Q)
15 (A)

SECRET.

PWIS(H)/LF/934.

Report on the Interrogation of
PW KP 196112 Feldw LAUN, Justus Ferdinand,
Hafen Batterie M.A.A. 266,
captured LE HAVRE on 12 Sep 44.

1. PREAMBLE.

PW is a priest by profession, strongly anti-Nazi and the founder of the 'Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Seelsorge(A.G.S.)' - the German Oxford Group. He is a personal friend of BUCHMAN and knew the late Dr. TEMPLE. In 1927 he received from the LAURA SPELLMAN-ROCKEFELLER-MEMORIAL-FOUNDATION a two years' fellowship for Social Research at any approved university and came to England to study Economics and Theology for a year at BIRMINGHAM University and a year at BALLIOL COLLEGE, OXFORD. In 1934 he went to Canada for six weeks on a tour of the country with BUCHMAN in connection with the latter's group.
In 1939 PW was called up to M Flak A 234, SYLT, where he was employed at Battle HQ and on Welfare work.
In Feb 42 he was called to the German Foreign Office through the influence of a friend of his there, named Pastor HERMANN SAUER, where as a 'Wissenschaftlicher Hilfsarbeiter' PW was required to make use of his considerable knowledge of the English language in translation in Pers Z Abt (PW did not know the meaning of this abbreviation).
In Jul 42 without any reason being given PW was dismissed from the Foreign Office and after considerable delay was posted to MAA 266 LE HAVRE.
PW took an oath not to disclose any infm regarding the German Foreign Office and as a priest he is therefore very reluctant to discuss any aspect of it. However, the infm given below is considered reliable.

2. PERS Z ABT, GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE (Feb - Jul 42).

(a) Location:- Ground-floor, PRINZESSIN VIKTORIA LOUISE STIFT, PODBIELSKI ALLEE, BERLIN-DAHLEM.

(b) Composition and Organisation:-

This dept consisted of about 50 civilian men and women of all ages. All were well educated and the general atmosphere was intellectual.
The dept was under comd of Geheimrat SELCHOW who also had an office in the WILHELMSTRASSE.
This dept was divided into sections(number unknown) which were probably all controlled by Regierungsraete. PW was unable to state number of people in each section.

(c) Duties:-

The whole dept was apparently concerned with the translation into German of diplomatic messages intercepted between the various enemy countries. PW's section was entirely concerned with messages to and from U.S.A. which were nearly all to or from the Secretary of State from or to American diplomatic representatives abroad, mostly in Turkey and the Mediterranean. The only exception was the American Red Cross whose messages were also intercepted.
When received in the dept, messages were already decoded. PW had no idea where this was done.
When translated, messages were given by PW to the official in charge of his section, Regierungsrat ZASTROW

MAI a. Return
SE
DATE

M.I.9.
4 DEC 1944
WAR OFFICE
M/68/4

a/42/4

In some cases messages which were considered important were apparently forwarded to the Foreign Minister and HITLER, as once when looking through some old messages in the files, PW saw some bearing the stamp "Seen by the Fuehrer" with part of the message underlined, which he was told had been done by the Foreign Minister.

(d) Personalities:-

Official in charge of Pers Z Abt - Geheimrat SELCHOW,

Official in charge of American section - Regierungsrat ZASTROW.

Major.
SIO Lingfield Cage.

LINGFIELD,
29 Nov 44.

JR/WAHN

Distribution:-

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MI 19	(45)
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